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THE DUTY TO DISCLOSE FORWARD-LOOKING
INFORMATION: A LOOK AT THE FUTURE OF MD&A
SUZANNE J. ROMAJAS
INTRODUCTION
Congress enacted the Securities Act of 1933' and the Securities Ex-
change Act of 19342 to provide for full and fair disclosure to investors.3
As the primary administrator of the federal securities statutes, the Secur-
ities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") was delegated the responsibility
of assuring that information important to investors' decisions is avail-
able.4 In some respects, however, the SEC's policies have hindered Con-
gress' goal of full disclosure. For instance, with respect to forward-
looking information,' the SEC's traditional policy was to prohibit its dis-
closure.6 Gradually, though, the SEC's disclosure philosophy underwent
a semi-revolution. Today the SEC encourages,7 and in some areas re-
quires,' the disclosure of forward-looking information. Full and fair dis-
1. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1988 & Supp. 11 1990) [hereinafter 1933 Act].
2. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-7811 (1988 & Supp. 11 1990) [hereinafter 1934 Act].
3. See Securities Exchange Bill of 1934, H.R. Rep. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 11
(1934) ("Just as artificial manipulation tends to upset the true function of an open mar-
ket, so the hiding and secreting of important information obstructs the operation of the
markets as indices of real value."); see also Sante Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462,
477-78 (1977) (describing the "fundamental purpose" of the 1934 Act as implementing a
"philosophy of full disclosure").
4. For example, in § 13(a) of the 1934 Act, the SEC is authorized to prescribe such
rules and regulations as are necessary for the protection of investors and to ensure fair
dealing in the securities markets. See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(a) (1988). Under the authority of
this section, the SEC has promulgated rules requiring corporations to file annual reports
on Form 10-K, quarterly reports on Form 10-Q, and current reports on Form 8-K. See
17 C.F.R. §§ 240.13a-1, 240.13a-11, 240.13a-13 (1992).
5. This type of information is included under the more common label of "soft infor-
mation," which generally includes opinions, predictions, analyses, and other subjective
evaluations. See House Comm. on Interstate & Foreign Commerce, 95th Cong., 1st
Sess., Report of the Advisory Comm. on Corporate Disclosure To The Securities and
Exchange Commission 347, abstracted in [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L Rep.
(CCII) 81,357, at 88,667 (Nov. 3, 1977) [hereinafter Advisory Committee Report]; Carl
W. Schneider, Nits, Grits, and Soft Information in SEC Filings, 121 U. Pa. L Rev. 254,
255 (1972). Since "soft information" can be both prospective and non-prospective, this
Note uses the label "forward-looking information" to denote the category of soft infor-
mation that is prospective only.
6. See infra notes 23-26 and accompanying text (describing SEC's traditional
policy).
7. See 17 C.F.R. § 229.10(b) (1992) ("Commission policy on projections. The Com-
mission encourages the use... of management's projections of future economic perform-
ance that have a reasonable basis and are presented in an appropriate format.").
8. See 17 C.F.R. § 229.303(a)(3)(ii) (1992) (mandating that corporations discuss in
the management discussion and analysis section of SEC filings "any known trends or
uncertainties that... [the corporation] reasonably expects will have a material favorable
or unfavorable impact on... revenues or income from continuing operations"); see also
Items 8 and 9 of Sched. 13E-3, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-100 (1992) (compelling disclosure of
certain predictions and other soft information in going private transactions).
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closure, however, appears to remain an unachieved ideal.
One required disclosure provision that recently has become a focal
point in the disclosure area is Item 303 of Regulation S-K.9 Item 303
creates an affirmative duty to disclose forward-looking information in the
Management's Discussion and Analysis ("MD&A") section of periodic
reports, proxy statements, and prospectuses."° Despite this disclosure re-
quirement, however, investors are still generally deprived of such for-
ward-looking information. This is partly because prior to its decision in
In re Caterpillar, Inc.,1I the SEC did not strictly enforce compliance with
Item 303.12 Moreover, the courts, consistent with their usual approach
to the nondisclosure of forward-looking information, 3 generally were
9. Regulation S-K was adopted in 1977 as part of the SEC's effort to integrate the
separate disclosure systems that evolved under the 1933 and 1934 Acts. See Adoption of
Disclosure Regulation and Amendments of Disclosure Forms and Rules, Securities Act
Release No. 5983, [1937-1982 Accounting Release Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 72,258, at 62,663 (codified at 17 C.F.R. Pt. 229). As such, the Regulation sets
forth substantive disclosure requirements for periodic reports, 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.13a-I,
240.13a-11, 240.13a-13 (1992); proxy statements, 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.14a-3, 240.14a-101,
item 13 (1992); and prospectuses, 15 U.S.C. § 77(j) (1990), 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.420-
230.432 (1992). Item 303 is a sub-section of Regulation S-K that sets forth the substan-
tive disclosure requirements for "[m]anagement's discussion and analysis of financial con-
dition and results of operation" contained in periodic reports, proxy statements, and
prospectuses. 17 C.F.R. § 229.303 (1992). For further discussion of Item 303's require-
ments, see infra notes 10, 65-119, and accompanying text.
10. Corporations are required to discuss and analyze in the Management's Discussion
and Analysis ("MD&A") section of SEC filings any known trends, events, or uncertain-
ties which are reasonably certain to impact future liquidity, capital resources, and results
of operation. Item 303 of Regulation S-K calls for the following, in relevant part:
Liquidity: [management must] [i]dentify any known trends or any known de-
mands, commitments, events or uncertainties that will result in or that are rea-
sonably likely to result in the [corporation's] liquidity increasing or decreasing
in any material way.
Capital Resources: [management must] [d]escribe any known material trends,
favorable or unfavorable, in the [corporation's] capital resources.
Results of Operations: [management must] [d]escribe any known trends or un-
certainties that have had or that the [corporation] reasonably expects will have
a material favorable or unfavorable impact on net sales or revenues or income
from continuing operations.
17 C.F.R. § 229.303(a)(l)-(3) (1992); see SEC Enforcement Chief Warns Companies,
CPAs On Management Discussion, Analysis, 16 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 95 (Jan. 13,
1984) (asserting that there is an affirmative duty to disclose forward-looking information
in the MD&A). For further discussion on the MD&A, see infra at notes 65-119 and
accompanying text. Examples of the type of information covered by this provision are
discussed infra at text accompanying notes 207-37.
11. Exchange Act Release No. 30,532, 6 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 73,830 (Mar. 31,
1992) [hereinafter Caterpillar] (first SEC enforcement action predicated entirely upon in-
adequate MD&A disclosures); see also infra notes 96-119 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing Caterpillar).
12. See Harvey L. Pitt et al., MD&A Through the Eyes of Management: A Closer
Look at the SEC's Caterpillar Decision, in 24th Annual Instit. on Sec. Reg. 481, 485 (PLI
Corp. L. & Practice Course Handbook Series No. B-792, 1992) (describing inadequate
compliance by corporations).
13. For a discussion of courts' general unwillingness to impose Rule lob-5 liability for
the nondisclosure of forward-looking information, see infra notes 124-47 and accompa-
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unwilling to enforce Item 303 through Rule lOb-5,1" which is the general
antifraud provision of the 1934 Act.
The failure of both the SEC and the courts to enforce Item 303 hurts
investors and thus impedes an important objective of the securities laws.
Noncompliance with Item 303 denies investors access to the information
that is most valuable to their investment decision. 5 Moreover, noncom-
pliance also theoretically results in a less efficient market.' 6 Thus, given
Congress' intent and the importance of the type of information required
by Item 303, the SEC and the courts should make every effort to enforce
compliance with that provision, including imposing Rule lOb-5 liability
for failure to disclose when there was an affirmative duty to do so under
Item 303 of Regulation S-K.
Focusing on the MD&A, this Note highlights the separate but parallel
approaches taken by the SEC and the courts regarding the disclosure of
forward-looking information. Part I lays out the history of the SEC's
nying text. The forward-looking information involved in the cases cited was not within
the mandatory disclosure requirement of Item 303. Such information was therefore an
optional disclosure under 17 C.F.R. § 229.10(b) (1992). However, as discussed through-
out this Note, courts appear not to have approached nondisclosure of mandatory for-
ward-looking information any differently than optional forward-looking information.
14. 17 C.F.R. § 240. 10b-5 (1992) ("It shall be unlawful for any person. . . (b)... to
omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light
of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading. . . ."). Although the
general rule is that there is no duty to disclose all material information, Rule lOb-5 is
often used as the source of an implied duty of disclosure. See Dennis J. Block et al.,
Affirmative Duty To Disclose Material Information Concerning Issuer's Financial Condi-
tion and Business Plans, 40 Bus. Law. 1243, 1249-50 (1985) [hereinafter Block et al.,
Affirmative Duty] (discussing general rule that there is no duty to disclose material infor-
mation when the corporation is not trading in its own stock, but listing numerous excep-
tions to the general rule). Despite the exceptions to the general rule, in the forward-
looking information context, many courts have declined to find such a duty and, there-
fore, have declined to impose Rule 10b-5 liability for the nondisclosure of forward-look-
ing information.
15. Since investment decisions are inherently forward-looking, the importance of
such information cannot be understated. Investors choose securities by balancing ex-
pected return against the degree of risk involved. See John S. Poole, Management Fore-
casts: Do They Have A Future In Corporate Takeovers?, 42 Sw. LJ. 765, 792 (1988)
[hereinafter Poole, Management Forecasts]. Moreover, although forward-looking infor-
mation was initially thought to be unreliable, see infra notes 23-26 and accompanying
text, that view has changed. The known trends and uncertainties required by Item 303
are less speculative and therefore more trustworthy than other forward-looking informa-
tion. For instance, projections, which are not required by Item 303, do not involve pres-
ent knowledge but involve hypothesizing and anticipating future events. Reliability
therefore should not be a major issue with the type of forward-looking information re-
quired by Item 303.
16. Empirical research has demonstrated that securities prices reflect publicly avail-
able information. Thus, increasing the amount of information generally available, espe-
cially information about the future prospects of the corporation, should increase the
efficiency of the securities markets. See John S. Poole, Improving the Reliability of Man-
agement Forecasts, 14 J. Corp. L. 547, 550 (1989) [hereinafter Improving the Reliability].
For a fuller discussion of the efficient markets theory, see Joseph DeSimone, Note,
Should Fraud on the Market Theory Extend to the Context of Newly Issued Securities?, 61
Fordham L. Rev. S151 (1993).
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approach to forward-looking information, highlighting its current stance
as to required and voluntary disclosures. Part II discusses the courts'
approaches to the duty to disclose forward-looking information under
Rule 10b-5, noting the influence of the SEC's position on this issue. Part
III suggests that, in assessing the duty to disclose the forward-looking
information required by Item 303 of Regulation S-K, courts should
adopt the test set forth by the SEC in its 1989 Interpretive Release. 17
This Part also suggests, as urged by the SEC, that once forward-looking
information is disclosed in the MD&A, courts should apply the safe har-
bor protection of Rules 175 and 3b-618 to prevent corporations from be-
ing punished for complying with SEC requirements.
I. THE SEC's APPROACH TO DISCLOSURE OF FORWARD-LOOKING
INFORMATION
The SEC's approach to the disclosure of forward-looking information
is constantly evolving. Its disclosure philosophy has moved from an ab-
solute prohibition on the disclosure of forward-looking information, to
its current position that most forward-looking information, such as pro-
jections, may be voluntarily disclosed. 9 Further, in Item 303 of Regula-
tion S-K,20 the SEC has progressed beyond its policy of voluntary
disclosure. In Item 303, the SEC mandates that corporations disclose in
the MD&A section of SEC filings any "known trends, demands, commit-
ments, events or uncertainties" that will have a material impact on future
liquidity, capital resources, and results of operations.2
The importance of the SEC's changing position on the issue cannot be
understated for, as the rule-making body in the area of securities regula-
tion, the SEC is considered the authority. Virtually every circuit address-
ing the disclosure of forward-looking information has devoted some
discussion to the SEC's position.22 An analysis of the SEC's evolving
17. See Management's Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of
Operations; Certain Investment Company Disclosure, Exchange Act Release No. 26,831,
6 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 72,436 and 73,193, at 62,843-44 (May 18, 1989) [hereinaf-
ter 1989 Interpretive Release]. For a full discussion of this test, see infra text accompany-
ing notes 80-86.
18. See Safe Harbor Rule For Projections, Exchange Act Release No. 15,944, [1979
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 82,117 (June 25, 1979) [hereinafter 1979 Safe
Harbor] (codified at 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.175, 240.3b-6 (1992)). The safe harbor provisions,
discussed infra notes 50-63 and accompanying text, shield from liability any forward-
looking information made in good faith and with a reasonable basis.
19. See 17 C.F.R. § 229.10(b) (1992) (encouraging but not requiring the disclosure of
forward-looking information in the form of projections).
20. See 17 C.F.R. § 229.303 (1992).
21. See 1989 Interpretive Release, supra note 17, 73,193, at 62,842 n.7.
22. See, e.g., Walker v. Action Indus., Inc., 802 F.2d 703, 709 (4th Cir. 1986), cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 1065 (1987); Starkman v. Marathon Oil Co., 772 F.2d 231, 239-40 (6th
Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1015 (1986); Flynn v. Bass Bros. Enters., Inc., 744 F.2d
978, 985-88 (3d Cir. 1984); Vaughn v. Teledyne, Inc., 628 F.2d 1214, 1221 (9th Cir.
1980); Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 478 F.2d 1281, 1292-94 (2d Cir. 1973).
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disclosure philosophy is therefore necessary to understand the courts' po-
sitions on the issue.
A. Traditional Policy of Exclusion
Traditionally, the SEC prohibited the use of forward-looking informa-
tion in disclosure documents.23 The reason for this prohibition primarily
was to protect unsophisticated investors.2' That investors placed a high
value on information contained in SEC filings raised the concern that the
inclusion of forward-looking information in SEC filings "would clothe
such information with an unduly high aura of credibility."' '25 Essentially,
the SEC determined that the risk of overly-optimistic management pre-
dictions outweighed the benefit derived by investors.26
B. The Move to Permissive Inclusion
1. The SEC's Evolving Position
In 1969 the SEC reexamined its traditional disclosure policy 27 after
recognizing, among other things, the growing criticism of the status quo
in disclosure,28 as well as the technological advances enabling investors
to obtain information from SEC filings.29 It determined that a better
balance between the needs of unsophisticated investors and the demands
23. See Statement by the Commission on Disclosure of Projections of Future Eco-
nomic Performance, Exchange Act Release No. 9984, [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCII) 79,211, at 82,666 (Feb. 2, 1973) [hereinafter 1973 Disclosure An-
nouncement] (acknowledging that "[lt has been the Commission's long standing policy
generally not to permit projections to be included in... reports filed with the Commis-
sion"). The SEC's prohibition on the use of forward-looking information also applied to
proxy statements. For an example of the SEC's traditional policy as applied to proxy
statement disclosures, see 17 C.F.L § 240.14a-9 note (1956); see also Adoption of
Amendments to Proxy Rules, Exchange Act Release No. 5276, [1956 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 76,380 (Jan. 17, 1956) (discussing note to Rule 14a-9 using
"predictions as to specific future market values, earnings [and] dividends" as examples of
what would be misleading in proxy statements). But see infra note 42. As applied to
disclosures in prospectuses, see Guidelines for the Release of Information by Issuers
Whose Securities Are in Registration, Securities Act Release No. 5180, [1970-1971
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CC) 78,192, at 80,578 (Aug. 16, 1971) (informa-
tion disclosed in prospectuses "should be limited to factual information and should not
include such things as predictions, projections, forecasts or opinions with respect to
value").
24. See Disclosure To Investors-A Reappraisal of Administrative Policies Under
the '33 and '34 Acts, [1963-1972 Special Studies Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 74,601, at 65,242 (May 9, 1969) [hereinafter Wheat Report] ("[P]rojections in
fied documents might become traps for the unsophisticated who would be prone to at-
tach more significance to such projections than they deserve.").
25. Schneider, supra note 5, at 258 (noting the effect that formal review of SEC filings
appears to have on investor reliance).
26. See id. at 268; 1973 Disclosure Announcement, supra note 23, at 82,667.
27. See Wheat Report, supra note 24, at 65,241.
28. See id.
29. See id.
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of knowledgeable investors was warranted. 30 However, it declined to
propose any changes in its traditional policies at that time.31
On the basis of information obtained through public hearings which it
conducted in 1972,32 the SEC came to acknowledge the importance of
forward-looking information to the investing public.33 In 1973, the SEC
took its first step toward integrating forward-looking information into
the disclosure system by repealing its traditional prohibition of forward-
looking information in SEC filings.34 It had determined that allowing
such information in SEC filings "would assist in the protection of inves-
tors and would be in the public interest. '35 The SEC's announcement,
however, expressly provided that the disclosure of forward-looking infor-
mation was only voluntary, not mandatory.3 6
The SEC then drafted proposals for implementing its new policy.
These proposals, published in 1975,11 received a great deal of public criti-
cism. 38 For instance, the proposals did not define any standard of mate-
riality applicable to the disclosure of forward-looking information, thus
making it difficult for corporations to determine when a disclosure might
30. See id.
31. See id. at 65,242. Several persons who participated in the Disclosure Study
Group which prepared the Wheat Report indicated their feelings that the Group missed
an opportunity by not "easing up" on the disclosure of projections. See The New Era in
SEC Disclosure: The Wheat Report, at 160, 162 (transcript from Securities Law Commit-
tee of the Federal Bar Association) (Sept. 5, 1969).
32. See Public Hearings on Estimates, Forecasts or Projections of Economic Perform-
ance, Exchange Act Release No. 9844, [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCh) % 79,075, at 82,323 (Nov. 1, 1972). At the time of these proceedings, corporations
were prohibited from including such information in SEC documents, but not from dis-
closing this information through other media. See id. (acknowledging that forecasts are
"in circulation"); see also 1973 Disclosure Announcement, supra note 23, at 82,667 (not-
ing that "projections are currently widespread in the securities markets"). According to
then-SEC Chairman William J. Casey, the 1972 hearings were held to allow the SEC to
decide whether it should take the lead in establishing standards for the disclosure of
forward-looking information for purposes of fostering corporate responsibility, increasing
the reliability of such disclosures, and increasing investor confidence. See id. at 82,323.
For a summary of comments received during the 1972 hearings, see Arthur Andersen and
FEI Counter Other SEC Witnesses, Call Projections Misleading, Not Helpful, Sec. Reg. &
L. Rep. (BNA) No. 180, at A5-6 (Dec. 6, 1972); SEC Hears How British Certify Earnings
Forecasts; Accountants Play 'Valuable Role" Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 179, at A7-
10 (Nov. 29, 1972); SEC Witnesses Urge Some Form of Projections in Financial Reports,
Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 178, at A6-9 (Nov. 22, 1972).
33. See 1973 Disclosure Announcement, supra note 23, at 82,666-67.
34. See id. at 82,667.
35. Id.
36. See id.
37. See Proposed Rules on Earnings Projections, Securities Act Release No. 5581,
[1974-1975 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 80,167 (Apr. 28, 1975) [hereinaf-
ter 1975 Proposed Rules].
38. Approximately 420 comment letters-generally critical-were received on these
proposals. For a summary of the comments, see Commission Reviews Comments on its
Projections Proposal. Changes Expected, Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 320, at DI-4
(Sept. 24, 1975) [hereinafter Commission Reviews Comments].
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be required.3 9 Furthermore, the proposals set forth very stringent re-
quirements for safe harbor protection 4° causing concern that the liability
exposure of corporations would be significantly increased if corporations
chose to make forward-looking disclosures.4" Yielding to the public crit-
icism, the SEC withdrew its proposals in 1976.42 The SEC reempha-
sized, however, its support for voluntary disclosure of projections in
public filings. 43 It proposed very general guidelines for voluntary for-
ward-looking disclosures, indicating that such disclosures must be in
good faith, have a reasonable basis, and be accompanied by information
sufficient to permit informed investment decisions.'
While the 1976 proposed guidelines awaited final approval, the SEC
appointed an Advisory Committee to review its disclosure policies, in-
cluding its policy on forward-looking information. 45 The primary func-
tion of the Advisory Committee was to study the current disclosure
system and collect the opinions of interested persons on the issue of for-
ward-looking disclosures.' At the conclusion of its study, the Advisory
Committee supported the SEC's move toward encouraging voluntary dis-
closure of forward-looking information, but stopped short of endorsing a
policy of mandatory disclosure.4' In addition, the Advisory Committee
declined to suggest a definition of materiality that would aid in assessing
the duty to disclose such information.4" In accordance with the Advi-
39. See 1975 Proposed Rules, supra note 37, at 85,302. Although the SEC's policy
was to encourage but not require the disclosure of forward-looking information, the 1975
proposals were intended to integrate such information into the public disclosure system
by requiring disclosure in SEC filings if material forward-looking information was non-
publicly furnished to any person. IaE
40. See 1975 Proposed Rules, supra note 37, at 85,302-04 (listing requirements for
safe harbor protection and placing burden on defendant of proving these requirements are
met). In contrast, the safe harbor provisions, as later promulgated, shield from liability
any forward-looking statements that meet the requirements of reasonableness and good
faith. Moreover, they place the burden on plaintiff. See infra notes 50-63 and accompa-
nying text.
41. See 1979 Safe Harbor, supra note 18, at 81,940 (noting commentators' feelings
that the "[1975] proposed rules would in all likelihood increase the institution of frivo-
lous, nuisance litigation ...with a resulting cost and time burden to be borne by
registrants").
42. See Adoption of Amendment to Rule 14a-9 and Withdrawal of Other Proposals,
Securities Act Release No. 5699, [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) F
80,461 (Apr. 23, 1976) [hereinafter 1976 Withdrawal]. In this statement, the SEC also
amended the note to Rule 14a-9, deleting the reference to "earnings" projections as an
example of misleading information in proxies. See id. at 86,201; see also 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.14a-9 note (1977).
43. See 1976 Withdrawal, supra note 42, at 86,202.
44. See id. at 86,203.
45. See Solicitation of Public Comments by Advisory Committee on Corporate Dis-
closure, Securities Act Release No. 5707, [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L Rep.
(CCH) % 80,531, at 86,374 (May 18, 1976).
46. See id at 86,374. A sampling of questions presented to interested parties included
what the standard of materiality for disclosure should be and whether the SEC should
require the disclosure of forward-looking information. See id. at 86,375.
47. See Advisory Committee Report, supra note 5, at 88,667.
48. See id. at 88,665-66.
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sory Committee Report, the SEC subsequently issued a statement en-
couraging, but not requiring, disclosure of management projections both
in filings with the SEC and in general.49
2. The SEC Safe Harbor Provisions
To enhance its policy of voluntary disclosure further, in 1979 the SEC
adopted rules to provide "safe harbor" protection for certain types of
forward-looking information filed with the SEC.50 Under Rules 175 and
3b-6,51 a qualifying forward-looking statement52 will not be considered
fraudulent "unless it is shown that such statement was made or reaf-
firmed without a reasonable basis or was disclosed other than in good
faith."53 These rules place the burden on plaintiffs to show the absence
of either good faith or a reasonable basis for the disclosure. 4
The purpose of the safe harbor rules is to encourage the voluntary
disclosure of forward-looking information by removing the deterrent of
liability for making such disclosures. 5 With this purpose in mind, the
SEC drafted the rules' definition of "forward-looking" information
broadly. "Forward-looking" information is defined in the safe harbor
rules as follows:
(1) A statement containing a projection of revenues, income (loss),
earnings (loss) per share, capital expenditures, dividends, capital struc-
ture or other financial items;
(2) A statement of management's plans and objectives for future
operations;
(3) A statement of future economic performance contained in manage-
ment's discussion and analysis ... included pursuant to Item 303 of
Regulation S-K ([17 C.F.R.] § 229.303); or
(4) Disclosed statements of the assumptions underlying or relating to
any of the statements described in ... (1), (2), or (3) of this section.5 6
49. See Guides for Disclosure of Projections of Future Economic Performance, Ex-
change Act Release No. 15,305, [1978 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
81,756, at 81,037 (Nov. 7, 1978) [hereinafter 1978 Disclosure Guides]. For further back-
ground, see Preliminary Response of the Commission to the Recommendations of the
Advisory Committee on Corporate Disclosure, Exchange Act Release No. 14,471, [1978
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) t 81,505 (Feb. 15, 1978).
50. See 1979 Safe Harbor, supra note 18, at 81,938. The safe harbor provisions are
still in effect today. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.175, 240.3b-6 (1992). For background, see
Proposed Safe Harbor Rule for Projections, Exchange Act Release No. 15,306, [1978
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) t 81,757 (Nov. 7, 1978) [hereinafter 1978 Safe
Harbor Proposal].
51. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.175, 240.3b-6 (1992).
52. A qualifying forward-looking statement is one that eventually appears in docu-
ments filed with the SEC or is contained in the annual report to shareholders. See infra
text accompanying notes 57-60.
53. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.175(a), 240.3b-6(a) (1992).
54. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.175(a), 240.3b-6(a) (1992); 1979 Safe Harbor, supra note 18,
at 81,940.
55. See 1978 Safe Harbor Proposal, supra note 50, at 81,042.
56. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.175(c), 240.3b-6(c) (1992).
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Although the definition of "forward-looking information" is broad,
protection under the safe harbor rules is limited by the requirement that
such information have been disclosed either in documents filed with the
SEC or in the annual report to shareholders.5 7 In addition, the safe har-
bor protection covers forward-looking statements made prior to an SEC
filing that are later reaffirmed in an SEC filing within a reasonable time.58
The protection also applies to subsequent affirmations of statements that
previously appeared in an SEC filing.59 This means that Rules 175 and
3b-6 do not protect forward-looking information in press releases or
statements to analysts, unless they also appear in SEC documents.'
The rationale for limiting safe harbor protection to statements made in
SEC filings is to give the SEC a better framework for analyzing a corpo-
ration's financial disclosures as a whole.61 In addition, this limitation
encourages corporations to take greater care in making forward-looking
statements6 2 -not only may their disclosures be reviewed closely by the
SEC for reasonableness, but also any forward-looking statements not
comporting with the requirements will lose protection under the safe har-
bor rules.6 3
The SEC indicated that it would monitor the effectiveness of its policy
toward the disclosure of forward-looking information. To date, its policy
57. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.175(b)(1), 240.3b-6(b)(1) (1992); see also 1979 Safe Harbor,
supra note 18, at 81,943 (listing safe harbor coverage of statements contained in registra-
tion statements, periodic reports, annual reports to shareholders, and "other documents
filed with the [SEC]"). To come within the safe harbor provisions, the annual report to
shareholders must meet the requirements of Rules 14a-3(b) and (c) or Rule 14c-3(b).
These provisions provide that annual reports to shareholders are not deemed to be filed
with the SEC except to the extent that the corporation has specifically requested that the
report be treated as part of the proxy soliciting material or has incorporated the report by
reference into the proxy statements. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.14a-3(c), 240.14c-3(b) (1992).
58. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.175(b)(1), 240.3b-6(b)(1) (1992); see also 1979 Safe Harbor,
supra note 18, at 81,943 (noting availability of safe harbor protection for forward-looking
statements if later disclosed in SEC filings).
59. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.175(b)(1), 240.3b-6(b)(1) (1992); see also 1979 Safe Harbor,
supra note 18, at 81,943 (noting availability of safe harbor protection for reaffirmations of
statements contained in prior SEC filings, provided that such reaffirmations meet the
standards of reasonable basis and good faith).
60. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.175(b)(1), 240.3b-6(b)(1) (1992); see also 1979 Safe Harbor,
supra note 18, at 81,943 (noting that statements made outside of SEC filings are covered
only if included in an SEC filing or annual reports to shareholders).
61. See 1979 Safe Harbor, supra note 18, at 81,943.
62. See id.
63. See id. While the safe harbor rules are supposed to benefit corporations which
make reasonable forward-looking disclosures in good faith, several commentators have
noted that the rules actually have provided little protection, especially under Rule lOb-5.
Apparently, the criticisms revolve around the imprecision of the terms "reasonable basis"
and "good faith." Poole, Management Forecasts, supra note 15, at 775 n.47. However, as
noted by the SEC, "there is ample precedent for the concept of good faith in other provi-
sions of the federal securities laws." 1979 Safe Harbor, supra note 18, at 81,941 (citing 15
U.S.C. §§ 78r(a), 78t(a), 78bb(e)(1), 80a-2(a)(41)(A)). For a discussion on the recent ap-
plication of safe harbors to forward-looking statements, see infra notes 256-73 and ac-
companying text.
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has remained relatively unchanged. Voluntary disclosure is still the rule
for most forward-looking information.?
C. Item 303 of Regulation S-K: Mandatory Disclosure of Certain
Forward-Looking Information
1. SEC's Historical Position on MD&A
The general notion that forward-looking information is encouraged
but not required is substantially altered by Item 303 of Regulation S-K,65
which requires the disclosure of certain forward-looking information in
the MD&A section of periodic reports, proxy statements and prospec-
tuses.6 6 Due to its mandatory nature, the MD&A has in recent years
become a focal point for the SEC in its review of the disclosure of for-
ward-looking information. 67 It has developed into the single most im-
portant disclosure provision in SEC filings and other disclosure
documents.6
The MD&A itself has been a required part of SEC filings since 1968.69
At that time, however, it required only summary statements about unu-
sual conditions affecting the corporation that might render its financial
64. See 17 C.F.R. § 229.10(b) (1992) (encouraging the use of forward-looking infor-
mation in documents specified by Rules 175 and 3b-6).
65. 17 C.F.R. § 229.303 (1992).
66. For a more detailed description of Item 303, see supra note 10.
67. See 1989 Interpretive Release, supra note 17, 72,436, at 62,144 (providing fur-
ther guidance to improve overall compliance with MD&A disclosure requirements); see
also SEC v. Bank of New England Corp., AAER-280, [1987-1991 Accounting Release
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCII) % 73,755, at 63,332 (D.D.C. 1990) (alleging
omissions of adverse trends in real estate market and loan portfolio which should have
been discussed in MD&A); In re American Say. & Loan Ass'n, Exchange Act Release
No. 25,788, [1987-1991 Accounting Release Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1
73,663, at 63,137-39 (June 8, 1988) (alleging omission of large repurchase transactions
made by the corporations which should have been discussed in the MD&A); In re Marsh
& McLennan Cos., Exchange Act Release No. 24,023, [1982-1987 Accounting Release
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 73,524, at 63,389-24 (Jan. 22, 1987) (alleging
nondisclosure in the MD&A of nature and effect of corporation's investment and financ-
ing activities); In re American Express Co., Exchange Act Release No. 23,332, [1982-
1987 Accounting Release Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) % 73,501, at 63,349-
3-49-4 (June 17, 1986) (finding MD&A deficiencies where corporation neglected to dis-
close reasons for earnings increase); In re Charter Co., Exchange Act Release No. 21,647,
[1982-1987 Accounting Release Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 73,448, at
63,176 (Jan. 10, 1985) (alleging nondisclosure of reasons for increased earnings and antic-
ipated future profit reduction); SEC v. Ronson Corp., [1983-1984 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 99,464, at 96,652 (D.N.J. 1983) (finding MD&A deficiencies where
corporation failed to disclose that a major customer suspended its purchases and was
unlikely to resume such purchases).
68. See Ted J. Fiflis, Financial Statements, the Management's Discussion and Analysis,
and the Accounting Provisions of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, C533 A.L.I.-A.B.A.
751 (June 18, 1990), available in Westlaw, JRL database.
69. See Guides for Preparation and Filing of Registration Statements, Securities Act
Release No. 4936, [1968 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) % 77,636 (Dec. 9,
1968).
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statements inappropriate.70 Although the format of the MD&A was al-
tered in 1974 to include a discussion of variations in income statement
items,71 the MD&A did not evolve into a full discussion until 1980. In
1980, the SEC incorporated the MD&A into its integrated disclosure sys-
tem where the MD&A evolved into a comprehensive discussion of items
such as liquidity, capital resources, results of operations, trends, events,
and uncertainties. 72 This change in the scope of the MD&A stemmed
from an acknowledgment that financial statements alone, with their brief
footnotes, were insufficient indicators by which to judge both the quality
of past earnings and the prospects for future earnings.73 The change was
intended to give investors an opportunity to look at the company
through the "eyes of management"'74 by requiring management to pro-
vide a narrative explanation of corporate financial statements, as well as
a short and long-term analysis of the corporation's business. 5
Since its adoption of Item 303, the SEC has conducted a continuous
review of MD&A disclosures. In particular, a special project was com-
menced in 1987 to review the adequacy of actual MD&A disclosures.7 6
Based on its findings in the first two phases of this project, the SEC is-
70. See id
71. See Notice of Adoption and Amendments to Guide 22 of the Guides for Prepara-
tion and Filing of Registration Statements Under the Securities Act of 1933, Securities
Act Release No. 5520, [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 79,924
(Aug. 12, 1974).
72. See Amendments to Annual Report Form, Related Forms, Rules, Regulations
and Guides; Integration of Securities Acts Disclosure Systems, Securities Act Release
No. 6231, [1937-1982 Accounting Release Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
72,301, at 62,815-17 (Sept. 2, 1980) (at the time, Item 303 was referred to as Item 11 of
Regulation S-K). Approximately one year after bringing the MD&A within Regulation
S-K, the SEC published a discussion of its expectations for Item 303 disclosures based on
its initial assessment of responses to the new requirements. See Management's Discus-
sion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of Operations, Exchange Act Re-
lease No. 18,120, [1937-1982 Accounting Release Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L Rep.
(CCH) 72,321 (Sept. 28, 1981). For specifics of Item 303's current requirements, see
supra note 10.
73. See Concept Release on Management's Discussion and Analysis of Financial
Condition and Operations, Exchange Act Release No. 24,356, [1987 Transfer Binder]
Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) 84,118, at 88,623 (Apr. 20, 1987) [hereinafter 1987 Concept
Release]. MD&A disclosure items are located both on and off a corporation's principal
financial statements. As such, investors are provided with a much broader range of infor-
mation than that provided by strictly historical financial statements and their brief
footnotes.
74. Id.
75. See id
76. In the initial phase of the project, the SEC focused on the MD&A disclosures of
218 corporations in 12 industries. See 1989 Interpretive Release, supra note 17, 72,436,
at 62,144 n.9 for a list of the industries involved. Of the 218 corporations involved, 206
were requested to amend or supplement their MD&A. See id at 62,145. The second
phase of the project commenced in 1988. One hundred and forty one corporations from
12 different industries were involved, with a large number again receiving comments from
the SEC regarding deficiencies in their MD&A disclosures. See id. For a list of the
industries involved, see id. at 62,145 n.12.
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sued an interpretive release in 1989."7 This release attempted to clarify
the SEC's interpretation of existing MD&A requirements.78 It instructed
that the purpose of the MD&A is to provide "material historical and
prospective textual disclosure enabling investors and other users to assess
the financial condition and results of operations of the registrant, with
particular emphasis on the registrant's prospects for the future."7 9 In
other words, Item 303 mandates that, under certain circumstances, cor-
porations disclose forward-looking information.
2. Standard for Disclosure in the MD&A
Determining whether Item 303 imposes a duty to disclose requires two
assessments:
(1) Is the known trend, demand, commitment, event or uncertainty
likely to come to fruition? If management determines that it is not
reasonably likely to occur, no disclosure is required.
(2) If management cannot make that determination, it must evaluate
objectively the consequences of the known trend, demand, commit-
ment, event or uncertainty, on the assumption that it will come to frui-
tion. Disclosure is then required unless management determines that a
material effect on the registrant's financial condition or results of oper-
ations is not reasonably likely to occur.80
As explained by the SEC in its 1989 Interpretive Release, this test is a
departure from the probability/magnitude test,8 announced by the
Supreme Court in Basic Inc. v. Levinson,82 for determining "materiality"
under Rule lOb-5. The significance of this departure is that, of the two,
Item 303's test has a lower threshold for finding a duty to disclose.8 3
The existence of a different standard for the disclosure of forward-
77. See id. at 62,143.
78. See id.
79. 1989 Interpretive Release, supra note 17, % 73,193, at 62,841.
80. Id. at 62,843.
81. See id. at 62,843 n.14:
MD&A mandates disclosure of specified forward-looking information, and
specifies its own standard for disclosure-ie., reasonably likely to have a mate-
rial effect. This specific standard governs the circumstances in which Item 303
requires disclosure. The probability/magnitude test for materiality approved by
the Supreme Court in Basic Inc v. Levinson, is inapposite to Item 303
disclosure.
Id. (citation omitted).
82. 485 U.S. 224 (1988). The probability/magnitude test is defined as a balancing of
the "'probability that [an] event will occur [against] the anticipated magnitude of the
event in light of the totality of the company activity.'" Id. at 238 (quoting SEC v. Texas
Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 849 (2d Cir. 1968)).
83. It is helpful to visualize the difference between the tests in mathematical terms.
With respect to the first step of Item 303's test, Former SEC Commissioner Fleischman
has suggested that "reasonably likely" may be in the 40% probability range. See Edward
H. Fleischman, The Intersection of Business Needs and Disclosure Requirements: MD&A,
Address to the Eleventh Annual Southern Securities Institute, at 12 (Mar. 1, 1991). With
respect to the second step, one commentator has noted that "the MD&A [test] requires
the probability [of occurrence] to be assumed at 100% unless it can be determined to be
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looking information in the MD&A is not inconsistent with Basic. In Ba-
sic, the Court was concerned with the disclosure of one very specific type
of forward-looking information-preliminary merger negotiations." In
determining whether there was a duty to disclose such information, the
Court applied the probability/magnitude test. It limited its decision to
the merger context, however, expressly stating that it was not addressing
the applicability of its test to the disclosure of projections or other for-
ward-looking information. 5 In practice, most courts have dispensed
with the probability/magnitude test when determining whether disclo-
sure of projections is required.86 Therefore, it is not surprising that Item
303 also dispenses with that test.
In addition to setting forth a materiality test to govern disclosures in
the MD&A, the 1989 Interpretive Release attempted to draw a clearer
distinction between the permissive disclosure of certain forward-looking
information, 7 such as forecasts, and the mandatory disclosure of other
forward-looking information, 8 such as presently known data that will
have an impact on future operating results.8 9 Not only is this distinction
important to application of the Item 303 test, it also reaffirms the SEC's
general position that not all forward-looking information must be dis-
closed.9' In the instructions to Item 30391 and in the 1989 Interpretive
close to zero, whereas Basic allows the probability of occurrence to be estimated at any
point from zero to 100%." Fiflis, supra note 68, at *5.
84. See Basic, 485 U.S. at 230.
85. The Court stated, "We do not address here any other kinds of contingent or spec-
ulative information, such as earnings forecasts or projections." Id. at 232 n.9.
86. See infra notes 124-47 and accompanying text (describing the numerous ap-
proaches taken by courts in Rule lOb-5 actions to the disclosure of forward-looking infor-
mation). Moreover, Item 303 accommodates Basic by making an exception for
preliminary merger negotiations. See 1989 Interpretive Release, supra note 17, 73,197,
at 62,851-52 ("While Item 303 could be read to impose a duty to disclose otherwise
undisclosed preliminary merger negotiations.... [the SEC will not require] ... a discus-
sion of the impact of [preliminary merger] negotiations [in the MD&A] where, in the
registrant's view, inclusion of such information would jeopardize completion of the
transaction.").
87. The SEC's current position on permissive disclosures is set forth in 17 C.F.R.
§ 229.10(b) (1992). See supra note 7.
88. The SEC's current policy on mandatory disclosures is set forth in Item 303 of
Regulation S-K See 17 C.F.R. § 229.303 (1992); see also supra note 10 (highlighting the
relevant provisions of Item 303).
89. The distinction between required and optional disclosures as articulated by the
SEC in its 1987 Concept Release and as reaffirmed in its 1989 Interpretive Release on
MD&A, is as follows:
Required disclosure [in the MD&A] is based on currently known trends. events
and uncertainties that are reasonably expected to have material effects ....
In contrast, optional forward-looking disclosure involves anticipating a future
trend or event or anticipating a less predictable impact of a known event, trend or
uncertainty.
1989 Interpretive Release, supra note 17, 73,193, at 62,842.
90. See 17 C.F.R. § 229.10(b) (1992) (setting forth SEC's general policy of encourag-
ing but not requiring disclosure of projections).
91. See 17 C.F.R. § 229.303(a), instruction 7 (1992).
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Release,92 the SEC has continued to encourage corporations to discuss
both types of forward-looking information by re-emphasizing its position
that the safe harbor protection of Rules 175 and 3b-6 applies both to
mandatory and to optional forward-looking disclosures.93
Since 1989, the SEC has continued to review MD&A compliance, fol-
lowing up with a third and fourth phase of its project. 94 Apparently
there has been little discernible improvement in MD&A disclosures, for
the SEC often has found compliance to be deficient and has required
corporations to amend their MD&A or has referred their cases to the
Division of Enforcement.95
3. In re Caterpillar, Inc.: An SEC Crackdown on MD&A
Apparently dissatisfied with the effectiveness of its pronouncements on
MD&A disclosure requirements, in March 1992 the SEC initiated its
first action predicated solely on MD&A violations. 96 Caterpillar has
been termed a "message case" intended to communicate that the SEC
requires "improved disclosures" of known trends and uncertainties.97
Although the SEC imposed no penalties on Caterpillar, other than re-
quiring Caterpillar to end its Item 303 violations and to establish proce-
dures for ensuring compliance, this action is expected to be a precursor
to more aggressive SEC enforcement of MD&A disclosure
requirements. 98
Focusing on the MD&A section of Caterpillar's 1989 Form 10-K and
first quarter 1990 Form 10-Q, the SEC found inadequate disclosure of
the risk of lower earnings in 1990 as well as the lack of any attempt to
quantify the impact of lower earnings, as required under Item 303.11
92. See 1989 Interpretive Release, supra note 17, 73,193, at 62,842.
93. See 17 C.F.R. § 229.303(a), instruction 7 (1992); 1989 Interpretive Release, supra
note 17, % 73,193, at 62,842.
94. See 1989 Interpretive Release, supra note 17, % 72,436, at 62,145, 62,145 n.13
(describing third phase and listing industries involved); Accounting and Disclosure:
MD&A, 22 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 80 (Jan. 12, 1990) (describing fourth phase as
involving previously targeted corporations). In addition, the SEC established a separate
task force to review the MD&As of banks and thrifts. See SEC May Bring Enforcement
Action for Inadequate Junk Bond Disclosures, 22 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1287 (Sept.
14, 1990).
95. See, e.g., SEC v. Bank of New England Corp., AAER-280, [1987-1991 Account-
ing Release Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 73,755, at 63,332 (D.D.C. Dec.
21, 1990) (alleging that BNE Corp.'s MD&A failed to adequately disclose "that certain
adverse trends indicating a deterioration in the New England real estate market as well as
in [the bank's] loan portfolio were reasonably likely to have material adverse effects on
[the bank's] future [loan losses] and related provisions and net income"). For a detailed
analysis of SEC enforcement actions in this area, see infra text accompanying notes 207-
37.
96. See Caterpillar, supra note 11, at 63,050.
97. See Caterpillar Settles SEC Charges It Made Inadequate MD&A Disclosures, 24
Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 447 (Apr. 3, 1992).
98. See Dennis J. Block & Jonathan M. Hoff, The SEC's 'Caterpillar' Order: Trends
In MD&A Disclosure, N.Y. L.J., July 2, 1992, at 5.
99. See Caterpillar, supra note 11, at 63,055-56.
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Caterpillar's Brazilian subsidiary ("CBSA") had been exceptionally
profitable in 1989 as a result of several extraordinary factorsl° ° that were
caused by Brazil's hyperinflation that year. Moreover, CBSA was a ma-
jor contributor to Caterpillar's 1989 earnings, accounting for approxi-
mately five percent of Caterpillar's revenues and twenty-three percent of
its net profits."'1 While Caterpillar reflected these earnings on its consol-
idated financial statements, it did not disclose management's knowledge
of CBSA's uncertain future earnings or the significance of CBSA to Cat-
erpillar's overall earnings.'0 2
In January 1990, prior to the filing of its 1989 Form 10-K, Caterpillar
management recognized that there were substantial uncertainties as to
whether CBSA would repeat its exceptional performance, in light of an-
ticipated sweeping economic reforms by a new administration in Bra-
zil.103 At a February 1990 board meeting, more than two weeks before
Caterpillar filed its 1989 Form 10-K, Caterpillar's Directors were told
that "Brazil was 'volatile' and that 'the impact of Brazil is so significant
to reduced 1990 projected results, [management] felt it was necessary to
explain it [to the directors] in some detail.' "1 At the same meeting, the
Board reviewed and approved the final draft of the 1989 Form 10-K,
including the MD&A.105 Despite the Board's detailed knowledge of
these uncertainties, Caterpillar's 1989 Form 10-K merely indicated that
"[s]ales in Brazil... could be hurt by post-election policies which will
likely aim at curbing inflation."' 6 The Form 10-K did not indicate that
a decline in CBSA's future results would have a material adverse effect
on Caterpillar's bottom line in 1990.107
The SEC found that Caterpillar's 1989 Form 10-K did not adequately
discuss management's uncertainty about CBSA's 1990 performance.
Caterpillar's failure to include information required by Item 303 left in-
vestors with an incomplete picture of Caterpillar's financial condition
and denied them the opportunity to see the company through the "eyes
of management."'' 0 Specifically, the Form 10-K failed to disclose
"known uncertainties reasonably likely to have a material effect on Cat-
erpillar's future results of operations, due to CBSA's questionable ability
to repeat its 1989 performance."" 9
Similarly, in its first quarter 1990 Form 10-Q, Caterpillar did not dis-
100. These extraordinary factors include currency gains, export subsidies, and interest
income.
101. See id. at 63,051.
102. See id.
103. See id.
104. Id. (alteration in original).
105. See id. at 63,052.
106. Id. at 63,053 n.4.
107. See id.
108. Id. at 63,055; see also supra text accompanying note 74 (describing purpose of
MD&A).
109. Caterpillar, supra note 11, at 63,055.
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cuss the growing body of knowledge available to it about the uncertain-
ties of CBSA's profitability. In March 1990, a new administration took
office in Brazil and sweeping economic and monetary changes were im-
mediately instituted in an effort to bring Brazil's hyperinflation under
control. 110 At the April 1990 board meeting, before Caterpillar's first
quarter 1990 Form 10-Q was filed, Caterpillar's management gave a pres-
entation discussing the likely negative effects that the economic reforms
in Brazil would have on CBSA's sales and profits: "Brazil is volatile and
difficult to predict. [Its] recently announced economic reforms have
made the situation even more uncertain.... [It is management's conclu-
sion that] profits in Brazil will be substantially lower than in 1989.""'
However, Caterpillar's Form 10-Q contained only the following state-
ment about Brazil: "[D]emand increased ... despite the uncertainty of
the Brazilian economy. The Company hasn't changed its outlook from
what was stated in its 1989 annual report."' 12 Based on the facts
presented to the Board and known by management, the SEC found that
"management could not [have] conclude[d] that lower earnings from
CBSA were not reasonably likely to occur."' 1 3
The SEC opined that Caterpillar's 1989 Form 10-K and first quarter
1990 Form 10-Q should have discussed the future uncertainties regard-
ing CBSA's operations, including the possible risk of Caterpillar having
materially lower earnings as a result of that risk.It 4 In addition, the SEC
noted that to the extent reasonably practicable, Caterpillar should have
quantified the impact of such risk." 5
Caterpillar is significant in that it demonstrates the SEC's resolve to
enforce Item 303 more aggressively through use of its newly authorized
cease and desist powers." 6 In addition, it may have a broad impact with
respect to the standard for disclosure of "known trends, events or uncer-
tainties," as set forth in the SEC's 1989 Interpretative Release."
17
110. See id. at 63,051-52.
111. Id. at 63,052.
112. Id. at 63,053 n.4.
113. Id. at 63,055. As stated earlier, the test of materiality under Item 303 requires
disclosure unless management determines that known trends and uncertainties are "not
reasonably likely" to have a material effect. See supra text accompanying note 80.
114. Interestingly, even if Caterpillar had segregated the figures for CBSA, thereby
highlighting the large contribution it made to Caterpillar's revenues and profit, the SEC
still would have required a full discussion of CBSA's risky operations. See Caterpillar,
supra note 11, at 63,051 n.1, 63,055 n.10 ("[E]ven if Caterpillar's financial statements had
displayed CBSA's results on a segregated basis ... that would not have obviated the
requirement that the CBSA's operations be discussed in the MD&A section of Caterpil-
lar's periodic reports.").
115. See id. at 63,055-56.
116. In 1990, under the Securities Enforcement Remedies and Penny Stock Reform
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78a-3, the SEC was granted unprecedented cease and desist powers.
These powers enable the SEC, among other things, to enforce more effectively compli-
ance with its disclosure regulations. For further discussion of this topic, see infra note
194.
117. See infra notes 169-87, 196-55, and accompanying text.
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The implications of Caterpillar to private securities litigation, however,
is uncertain. Item 303 of Regulation S-K does not provide a private right
of action for shareholders. Moreover, the SEC did not allege that Cater-
pillar had violated Rule lOb-5. Indeed, because MD&A disclosure is
based upon a lower standard of disclosure than is typically applied to
forward-looking information,1 ' it is not clear whether a Rule lOb-5
claim based on MD&A deficiencies would be viable. There is some indi-
cation in post-Caterpillar decisions, however, that a Rule lOb-5 claim
based on such deficiencies may be viable.'1 9
II. THE COURTS' APPROACH TO THE DISCLOSURE OF FORWARD-
LOOKING INFORMATION
To date, no court has imposed Rule lOb-5 liability for an Item 303
violation. 2 The cases dealing with the issue of nondisclosure of for-
ward-looking information, however, indicate that the courts' reluctance
to impose Rule lOb-5 liability for Item 303 violations may be a result of
their general reluctance to impose Rule lOb-5 liability for nondisclosure
of any forward-looking information. 21 Thus, it is instructive to analyze
courts' treatment of the nondisclosure of forward-looking information,
outside of the Item 303 context.
A. Current Standards for Determining Whether Forward-Looking
Information Must Be Disclosed
Since no specific statutory or regulatory obligation, other than Item
303 of Regulation S-K, imposes an affirmative duty to disclose forward-
looking information, courts have looked to antifraud statutes to find
whether and when such a duty arises." Although courts have been in-
fluenced by the SEC's position on this issue, 23 it is apparent that the
courts' approaches have not evolved completely with the SEC's. Today,
118. See supra notes 81-83 and accompanying text.
119. See infra text accompanying notes 169-87.
120. This Note uses the term "Item 303 violation" to refer to the nondisclosure of
forward-looking information that is required to be disclosed in the MD&A pursuant to
Item 303 of Regulation S-K.
121. To date, Item 303 violations have not been actively pursued in the courts under
Rule lOb-5. However, the nondisclosure of other forward-Iooking information, such as
projections which may be voluntarily disclosed under 17 C.F.R. § 229.10(b), have been
pursued. The cases discussed in this section deal with forward-looking information other
than that required to be disclosed under Item 303 of Regulation S-K.
122. The language of Rule lob-5 states that "[i]t shall be unlawful for any person ...
(b) [t]o... omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made,
in light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading .... " 17
C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(b) (1992). See Block et al., Affirmative Duty, supra note 14, at 1245-
55 (discussing exceptions to the general rule that there is no duty to disclose material
information when the corporation is not trading in its own stock).
123. See supra notes 19-64 and accompanying text for a review of the SEC's approach
to forward-looking disclosures outside the Item 303 context.
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there are at least four different approaches 24 to assessing the duty to
disclose forward-looking information in Rule lOb-5 actions.12 Regard-
less of which of the four standards are applied though, few cases have
found liability for omitted forward-looking information.
1. Traditional Exclusion Standard
Under the traditional view, a corporation never has a duty to disclose
forward-looking information.1 26 This approach has its origins in the
SEC's traditional position that projections were inherently misleading.' 27
Now that the SEC has substantially modified its policy, however, some
argue that this approach is no longer supportable. 28 Despite the SEC's
move toward encouraging forward-looking disclosures, though, the First
and Second Circuits on occasion do apply this test. 2 9
124. These approaches, discussed infra text accompanying notes 124-47, have received
extensive analysis and discussion elsewhere. See J. Robert Brown, Jr., The Regulation of
Corporate Disclosure 205-12 (Prentice Hall 1992 Supp.); Bruce A. Hiler, The SEC and
the Courts' Approach to Disclosure of Earnings Projections, Asset Appraisals, and Other
Soft Information: Old Problems, Changing Views, 46 Md. L. Rev. 1114 (1987); Janet E.
Kerr, A Walk Through the Circuits: The Duty to Disclose Soft Information, 46 Md. L.
Rev. 1071 (1987); Poole, Management Forecasts, supra note 15, at 765; Richard P. Brull,
Note, Trigger Disclosure: A Proposal For The Disclosure Of Projections of Future Eco-
nomic Performance by Target Companies During Tender Offers, 56 Geo. Wash. L. Rev.
313 (1988); Jude Sullivan, Note, Materiality of Predictive Information After Basic: A Pro-
posed Two-Part Test of Materiality, 1990 U. Ill. L. Rev. 207.
It should also be noted that the approaches of some courts simply do not fit into any of
the four categories. See Garcia v. Cordova, 930 F.2d 826, 830 (10th Cir. 1991) ("While
we do not attempt to synthesize these [four] approaches here, we agree with the Fifth
Circuit that in each case the dispositive factors are the nature of the undisclosed predic-
tive information and its importance, reliability and investor impact as determined from
the facts of each case."); Isquith v. Middle S. Utils., Inc., 847 F.2d 186, 205 n. 14, 206 (5th
Cir.) ("We make no attempt today either to examine in detail the several approaches
which the various circuits have endorsed or to determine when, or even if, predictive
information must be disclosed.. . ."), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 926 (1988).
125. As alluded to earlier, there exists a variety of approaches to the disclosure of
forward-looking information that are not inconsistent with the Supreme Court's opinion
in Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988). See supra text accompanying notes 84-86.
Given the Supreme Court's statement that it was not addressing the applicability of its
probability/magnitude test to the disclosure of forward-looking information, other than
preliminary merger negotiations, Basic, 485 U.S. at 232 n.9, courts have dispensed with
the probability/magnitude test when determining whether disclosure of projections is re-
quired. See, e.g., Garcia, 930 F.2d at 829 n.l:
We do not feel obligated to apply that test to the facts of this case.., inasmuch
as the Supreme Court in Basic specifically limited its decision to the context of
merger negotiations and disavowed any attempt to "address... any other kinds
of contingent or speculative information, such as earnings forecasts or
projections."
126. The leading case applying this approach is Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 478
F.2d 1281, 1292-94 (2d Cir. 1973).
127. See supra text accompanying notes 23-26; see also Poole, Management Forecasts,
supra note 15, at 781 (arguing that the traditional approach "is an anachronism with no
place in the modern investment environment").
128. See Poole, Management Forecasts, supra note 15, at 781.
129. See, e.g., Pavlidis v. New England Patriots Football Club, Inc., 737 F.2d 1227,
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2. Reasonable Certainty Standard
Some courts have held that no affirmative duty to disclose forward-
looking information arises unless such information is "reasonably cer-
tain.i"13  Courts applying the reasonable certainty standard have noted
the changed SEC position from that of a total ban to an encouragement
of forward-looking disclosure. These courts, however, appear to be more
focused on the fact that forward-looking disclosure is still not
mandatory.1
31
This approach affords great deference to management's decisions
about disclosing forward-looking information, a deference which sug-
gests that a fairly high standard of reasonable certainty is required before
a court would find a duty to disclose. ' 32 For example, without even go-
ing into an analysis of the reliability or relevance of the information with-
held, 1 33 courts have upheld management determinations not to disclose
internal projections. Such management decisions have been upheld even
when the projections differed significantly from published statements.1''
This approach fails to recognize, however, that internal projections are
not necessarily unreliable or lacking in reasonable certainty. 13
Given the SEC's encouragement of forward-looking disclosures and its
command for disclosure of the particular forward-looking information
described by Item 303, some commentators have criticized courts' reluc-
tance to find a duty to disclose.1 36 Nevertheless, this position continues
to be maintained in the Fourth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits. 31
1233, 1234-35 (1st Cir. 1984) (applying traditional approach to nondisclosure of projec-
tions because SEC policy was to discourage disclosure projections at time statements
were issued); Mendell v. Greenberg, 612 F. Supp. 1543, 1550 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (applying
traditional approach to financial projections despite change in SEC policy because new
disclosure policy is only voluntary and not mandatory), rev'd in part, 927 F.2d 667 (2d
Cir. 1990); Flun Partners v. Child World, Inc., 557 F. Supp. 492, 499 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
130. See, eg., Walker v. Action Indus., Inc., 802 F.2d 703, 710 (4th Cir. 1986), cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 1065 (1987); Vaughn v. Teledyne, Inc., 628 F.2d 1214, 1221 (9th Cir.
1980).
131. See e.g., Walker, 802 F.2d at 709 ("[W]e believe that a further transition, from
permissive disclosure to required disclosure, should be occasioned by congressional or
SEC adoption of more stringent disclosure requirements for financial projections, rather
than by the courts.").
132. See Poole, Management Forecasts, supra note 15, at 785.
133. See Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 292-93 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 1092 (1981).
134. See id. at 292.
135. See Poole, Management Forecasts, supra note 15, at 783.
136. See id at 784 n.ll0.
137. See, e.g., In re Convergent Technologies Sec. Litig., 948 F.2d 507, 516 (9th Cir.
1991) (holding that internal projections lacking "reasonable certainty" did not have to be
disclosed); Walker v. Action Indus., Inc., 802 F.2d 703, 709 n.ll, 710 (4th Cir. 1986)
(stating that "it would appear prudent to release only those projections that are reason-
ably certain"), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1065 (1987); Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646
F.2d 271, 292 (7th Cir.) (although court stated it was not specifically adopting any of the
various positions held by other circuits, court supported release of reasonably certain
forward-looking information), cert denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981).
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3. Substantial Certainty Standard
The Sixth Circuit has employed a "substantial certainty" standard,
which analyzes disclosure solely in terms of reliability. 13 8 Under this ap-
proach, forward-looking information generally need not be disclosed un-
less it is "virtually as certain as hard facts." 139 As a practical matter, this
standard virtually precludes the finding of an affirmative duty to disclose
by creating an insurmountable barrier. Forward-looking information,
particularly in the form of projections, is by its nature uncertain due to
the potentially large number of assumptions used."4
Critics of the substantial certainty approach argue that it ignores the
importance of forward-looking information and utilizes an archaic and
unattainable standard inconsistent with modem SEC policies and philos-
ophies.14 This standard, however, continues to be used in the Sixth
Circuit. 142
4. Balancing Approach
The Third Circuit has taken a unique position on the disclosure of
forward-looking information by adopting a balancing test1 43 which takes
into account the relevance and reliability of forward-looking information.
According to this approach, courts must "ascertain the duty to disclose
[forward-looking] information on a case-by-case basis, by weighing the
potential aid such information will give a shareholder against the poten-
tial harm, such as undue reliance, if the information is released with a
proper cautionary note." 144
Of all the standards applied by courts today, this goes farthest toward
requiring the disclosure of forward-looking information. Unlike the
traditional exclusion and reasonable certainty standards, 145 this approach
138. See Starkman v. Marathon Oil Co., 772 F.2d 231, 241 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. de-
nied, 475 U.S. 1015 (1986).
139. Id.
140. See J. Robert Brown, Jr., Corporate Communications and the Federal Securities
Laws, 53 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 741, 798 n.257; see also Janet H. Doyle, Disclosure of
Forecasts and Projections, 2 Insights (P-H) No. 6, at 10 (Feb. 1992), available in Westlaw,
JRL database (describing projections as "what-if" scenarios that are based on hypotheti-
cal assumptions).
141. See, e.g., Poole, Management Forecasts, supra note 15, at 790 (calling the substan-
tial certainty standard a "step backward toward the outmoded traditional ... view").
142. See Radol v. Thomas, 772 F.2d 244, 252-53 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 477 U.S.
903 (1986); Rice v. Hamilton Oil Corp., 658 F. Supp. 446, 448 (D. Colo. 1987).
143. See Flynn v. Bass Bros. Enters., Inc., 744 F.2d 978 (3d Cir. 1984).
144. Id. at 988. Factors reflecting the relevance of the information, include its impor-
tance to the shareholders' impending decision, its uniqueness, and the availability of other
more reliable sources of information. See id. Reliability is determined by assessing the
facts upon which the soft information was based, the qualifications of those who prepared
it, its original purpose, and the degree of subjectivity or bias reflected in its preparation.
See id.
145. See Walker v. Action Indus., Inc., 802 F.2d 703, 709 (4th Cir. 1986), cert. denied,
479 U.S. 1065 (1987); Mendell v. Greenberg, 612 F. Supp. 1543, 1550 n.8 (S.D.N.Y.
1985), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 927 F.2d 667 (2d Cir. 1990).
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views the movement by the SEC from a policy of discouraging disclosure
to one of encouraging disclosure as a significant recognition of the impor-
tance of forward-looking information. 1"6 To date, this balancing ap-
proach appears to have been employed solely within the Third Circuit. 147
B. Judicial Treatment of MD&A Deficiencies
Prior to Caterpillar, most courts rejected outright Rule lOb-5 claims
based on Item 303 violations. Since the SEC issued its March 1992 cease
and desist order in Caterpillar, however, courts seem to be somewhat
more willing to explore the possibility of imposing securities fraud liabil-
ity for Item 303 violations.
1. Pre-Caterpillar Cases
Prior to the Caterpillar action in March 1992, only courts in the Third
and Ninth Circuits had addressed whether Rule lOb-5 liability may be
imposed for Item 303 violations. 148 Just as these circuits differed in their
approach to the disclosure of forward-looking information in general, 49
they also differed in their approach to the issue of whether Rule lOb-5
liability may be imposed for Item 303 violations.' The Third Circuit
indicated a willingness to impose liability, while the Ninth Circuit was
firm in its position that Item 303 of Regulation S-K does not impose a
duty to disclose under Rule lOb-5.
146. See flynn, 744 F.2d at 986-88.
147. See, e.g., Walter v. Holiday Inns, Inc., [Current Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 97,344, at 95,757 (3d Cir. 1993) (applying Flynn); Hoffman Elec., Inc. v.
Emerson Elec. Co., 754 F. Supp. 1070, 1081 (W.D. Pa. 1991) (applying Flynn in deter-
mining duty to disclose forward-looking statements); In re Bell Atlantic Corp. Sec. Litig.,
Civ.A.Nos. 91-0514, 91-0518, 91-0531, 91-0673, 91-0748, 1991 WL 234236, at *3-4
(E.D. Pa. Oct. 30, 1991) (same); In re Craftmatic Sec. Litig., 703 F. Supp. 1175, 1180
(E.D. Pa. 1989) (using the Flynn analysis, court concluded that omitted information was
"highly speculative and would have provided only minimal aid-if any-to prospective
shareholders"), aff'd in part rev'd in part, 890 F.2d 628 (3d Cir. 1990).
148. See In re Convergent Technologies See. Litig., 948 F.2d 507, 516 (9th Cir. 1991);
In re Verifone See. Litig., 784 F. Supp. 1471, 1483 (N.D. Cal. 1992); Alfus v. Pyramid
Technology Corp., 764 F. Supp. 598, 607-08 (N.D. Cal. 1991); Bell Atlantic, 1991 WL
234236, at *8-*9.
149. See supra text accompanying notes 130-37, 143-47. The Third Circuit has em-
ployed a balancing test, while the Ninth has applied a reasonable certainty test.
150. In fact, their differences have continued post-Caterpillar. Compare In re Donald
J. Trump Casino Sec. Litig., 793 F. Supp. 543, 558 (D.N.J. 1992) (in analyzing alleged
omissions in MD&A section of prospectus, court looked to language of document to
determine whether known uncertainties were disclosed) with In re Lyondell Petrochemi-
cal Co. Sec. Litig., [Current Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) Ir 97,335, at
95,704-05 (9th Cir. 1993) (refusing to analyze alleged omissions in MD&A section of
prospectus after reading Instruction 7 to Item 303 to mean that forward-looking informa-
tion need not be disclosed).
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a. Pre-Caterpillar Indications That Rule lOb-5 Claims Based on Item
303 Violations May Be Viable
Although never actually imposing Rule l0b-5 liability for Item 303
violations, at least one court in the Third Circuit intimated a willingness
to impose such liability if presented with the correct factual scenario.
Prior to Caterpillar, the Eastern District of Pennsylvania addressed the
issue in In re Bell Atlantic Corp. Securities Litigation.5' There the plain-
tiffs initiated an action under Rule 10b-5, alleging that Bell's third quar-
ter 1990 Form 10-Q violated Item 303(b) of Regulation S-K 152 because it
failed to disclose any "known trends, demands, commitments, events or
uncertainties which are reasonably likely to have material effects on a
[corporation]'s financial condition or results of operations."' 5 3 The court
ultimately dismissed this allegation because plaintiffs failed to allege the
specific events, trends, or transactions that Bell did not disclose and,
therefore, failed to state a case for an Item 303(b) violation.'
Despite dismissing the case, the court gave some indication of how it
would have ruled if the plaintiffs had alleged with specificity the events,
trends, and transactions that defendants failed to disclose. Relying on
the 1989 Interpretive Release for guidance, the court noted that if a cor-
poration knows of events that are reasonably likely to have a material
impact with respect to changes in liquidity, capital resources, or results
of operations, the failure to disclose them in a Form 10-Q would violate
Item 303(b). 15 The Third Circuit's willingness to analyze Item 303 in a
Rule lOb-5 action and to apply the test established in the 1989 Interpre-
tive Release indicates that, at least in the Third Circuit, some progress
has been made toward bringing the courts' approach to the disclosure of
forward-looking information in line with the SEC's.
b. Pre-Caterpillar Rejection of Rule 10b-5 Claims Based
on Item 303 Violations
Courts in the Ninth Circuit have dealt with this issue more fre-
quently.1 56 In contrast to the Third Circuit, these courts were unwilling
151. 1991 WL 234236 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 30, 1991).
152. Item 303(b) of Regulation S-K pertains to MD&A disclosures in the Form 10-Q
quarterly reports filed with the SEC. See 17 C.F.R. § 229.303(b) (1992).
153. Bell Atlantic, 1991 WL 234236, at *8 (citing 1989 Interpretive Release, supra note
17, at 62,842 n.7).
154. See id. at *8-*9.
155. See id. at *8.
156. Plaintiff attorneys used the Ninth Circuit to test the viability of Rule lob-5 claims
premised on Item 303 violations. The initial cases were all dismissed, however, because
plaintiffs failed to allege the violation of Item 303 which, at a minimum, requires allega-
tions of an omission in SEC filings. See, e.g., In re Sun Microsystems, Inc. Sec. Litig.,
[1990 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 95,504, at 97,636-37 (N.D. Cal. 1990)
(10b-5 claim based on Item 303 violations dismissed as "flawed" because plaintiffs alleged
omissions only in the press release announcing quarterly results but failed to allege omis-
sions in an SEC filing); Alfus v. Pyramid Technology Corp., 745 F. Supp. 1511, 1517-18
(N.D. Cal. 1990) (same) ["Alfus F']; In re Gap Sec. Litig., [1989-1990 Transfer Binder]
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to impose Rule 10b-5 liability on corporations for Item 303 violations.
The case which set the tone for the Ninth Circuit's approach to Rule
10b-5 claims based on Item 303 violations was Alfus v. Pyramid Technol-
ogy Corp. 157 ("Alfus II"). In Alfus II, the court concluded that an Item
303 violation does not inevitably result in Rule 10b-5 liability for nondis-
closure, for under Rule 10b-5 "[s]uch a duty to disclose must be sepa-
rately shown." ' Plaintiff's Rule 10b-5 claims alleged that Pyramid
violated Item 303 by failing to disclose in its annual and quarterly reports
known adverse data about softening demand and technological
problems. 59 Focusing on the SEC's 1989 Interpretive Release wherein
the SEC rejected the probability/magnitude test of Basic in favor of a
"reasonably likely to have [a] material effect" test, the court concluded
that allegations of Item 303 violations would not be actionable under
Rule 10b-5. 1'
The position in A/fus II was reaffirmed by the Ninth Circuit in In re
Convergent Technologies Securities Litigation.6 In Convergent Technol-
ogies, plaintiff alleged that pursuant to Item 303 of Regulation S-K, de-
fendant was required to disclose in its prospectus internal cost
projections pertaining to its new product line. Noting that it was not
passing on the relevance of Regulation S-K to the Rule lOb-5 claims
before it,162 the court expressly rejected a duty to disclose forward-look-
ing data, relying on the statement in Instruction 7 to Item 303 that" 'for-
ward-looking' information need not be disclosed in Regulation S-K
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. V 94,724, at 93,908-09 (N.D. Cal. 1988) (same); see also In re Conver-
gent Technologies Sec. Litig., 948 F.2d 507, 514, 516 (9th Cir. 1991) (although court's
analysis differed from the earlier cases, here also, plaintiffs alleged an omission in a press
release but not an SEC filing).
Shortly after these "test" cases, plaintiff attorneys corrected their earlier mistakes and,
in future cases, merely alleged omissions in both the press release and the corresponding
SEC filing. See In re Verifone Sec. Litig., 784 F. Supp. 1471, 1477 (N.D. Cal. 1992). It
should be noted that, generally, the purpose of the press releases at issue in these cases is
to pre-announce the corporation's annual or quarterly results. Therefore, the press re-
lease and the corresponding annual or quarterly SEC filing essentially mirror each other.
157. 764 F. Supp. 598 (N.D. Cal. 1991).
158. Id. at 608 (emphasis added).
159. See id. at 607; see also Alfus I, 745 F. Supp. at 1517 (providing further factual
background).
160. Alfus II, 764 F. Supp. at 608. The court's reasoning, however, seems somewhat
flawed in that Basic's probability/magnitude test generally is not used to determine the
duty to disclose forward-looking information other than the duty to disclose preliminary
merger negotiations. See supra notes 81-83, 125, and accompanying text. For a more
recent approach to the issue in the Ninth Circuit, see infra notes 186-87 and accompany-
ing text.
161. 948 F.2d 507 (9th Cir. 1991).
162. See id. at 516. The court gave no reason for its treatment of the cost projections
at issue as voluntary disclosure items rather than as known trends, events, and uncertain-
ties required by Item 303. Such projections, arguably, were known uncertainties that
should have been disclosed. See id. at 510 (noting that prior to its March 1983 prospec-
tus, Convergent Technologies' management became aware of serious pricing and cost
problems with the product line).
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filings." '163 This position generally has been followed in the Ninth Cir-
cuit, even though the court in Convergent Technologies did not analyze
the nature of the forward-looking information at issue, but merely pre-
sumed that such information was a permissive disclosure.
The decision in In re Verifone Securities Litigation 164 exemplifies how
courts in the Ninth Circuit have applied the position taken in Convergent
Technologies. In Verifone, plaintiffs alleged that the defendant's Forms
10-Q for the first and second quarters of 1990 failed to disclose that its
earnings were atypically boosted by one-time orders and that such earn-
ings were not likely to be repeated in the forthcoming quarters. 65 Refer-
ring to required Item 303 disclosures as "known historic trends,"' 66
rather than as known trends reasonably likely to affect the future, the
court dismissed the case, holding that Item 303 of Regulation S-K "does
not provide a basis of liability where a corporation fails to 'disclose' the
future." 67
2. Post-Caterpillar Cases
After the Caterpillar decision in March 1992, courts in the First, Sec-
ond, Third, and Ninth Circuits addressed whether Rule lOb-5 liabilities
could be imposed pursuant to Item 303 violations. 68 Although none of
the courts ultimately imposed liability for Item 303 violations, it appears
that courts in at least three of the four circuits may be willing to do so.
a. Circuits Currently Demonstrating Support for Imposition of Rule
10b-5 Liability Based on MD&A Deficiencies
Although to date no liability has been found, district courts in Con-
necticut and New Jersey have indicated that a Rule 1Ob-5 action based
on Item 303 violations may be viable.' 69
163. Id. at 516. It is very misleading for the court to have focused so narrowly on this
Instruction. In the 1987 Concept Release, supra note 73, at 88,624, the SEC explained
that Instruction 7 is not intended to distract from the requirements expressly set forth in
Item 303.
164. 784 F. Supp. 1471 (N.D. Cal. 1992).
165. See id. at 1477.
166. Id. at 1483 (emphasis added).
167. Id. (citing In re Convergent Technologies Sec. Litig., 948 F.2d 507, 516 (9th Cir.
1991)). As with the court in Convergent Technologies, the court here construed Item 303
as not requiring the disclosure of forward-looking information. A review of SEC enforce-
ment actions and interpretive releases, however, indicates that the data at issue in Ver-
ifone was clearly of the type required to be disclosed under Item 303. See infra notes 223-
30 and accompanying text (indicating that Item303 requires disclosure of extraordinary
results, such as those involved in Verifone).
168. See In re Lyondell Petrochemical Co. Sec. Litig., [Current Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) f 97,335, at 95,704-05 (9th Cir. Jan. 29, 1993); Greenstone v.
Cambex Corp., 975 F.2d 22, 27-28 (1st Cir. 1992); Ferber v. Travelers Corp., 802 F.
Supp. 698, 711 (D. Conn. 1992); In re Donald J. Trump Casino Sec. Litig., 793 F. Supp.
543, 558 (D.N.J. 1992); In re Cypress Semiconductor Sec. Litig., [1992 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. V 97,060, 94,698 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 23, 1992).
169. See Ferber, 802 F. Supp. 698 (D. Conn. 1992); Trump Casino, 793 F. Supp. 543
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In Ferber v. Travelers Corp., 7 ° plaintiffs alleged violations of Rule lOb-
5 for Travelers' failure, in its third quarter 1989 Form 10-Q and first and
second quarter 1990 Forms 10-Q, to adequately identify and describe
negative trends throughout its real estate asset portfolios. 1 ' Performing
the two-step analysis set forth in the SEC's 1989 Release,1" 2 the Connect-
icut district court found that plaintiff's nondisclosure claim failed as a
matter of law because Travelers' MD&A section did in fact disclose
"'known trends' and 'uncertainties'" as required by Item 303. 173 Plain-
tiff's claim was therefore dismissed.' 74
In In re Donald J. Trump Casino Securities Litigation,'"7 plaintiffs al-
leged that Trump Casinos' prospectus failed to disclose, as required by
Item 303, that there were known uncertainties regarding whether suffi-
cient revenues could be generated to cover the debt service on the Taj
Mahal. 176 The court dismissed the allegation, finding repeated warnings
in the prospectus that there were "uncertainties" as to the Taj Mahal
partnership's ability to service its debt.'7 7 Trump Casinos' prospectus
clearly stated that the Taj Mahal had no history of earnings, that its
operations would be subject to the risks that accompany the establish-
ment of a new business, and that its ability to service debt was dependent
on many factors not within its control. 78 Given these disclosures, the
court stated that no reasonable jury could find that the prospectus
"'omitted to state'" uncertainties regarding the partnerships' ability to
generate funds.17 9
Although the courts in Ferber and Trump Casino ultimately found no
Rule lOb-5 liability for Item 303 violations, their analyses indicate an
acceptance, at least in principle, of Item 303 violations as a basis for Rule
lOb-5 actions.' However, though both cases demonstrated the courts'
willingness to apply the test set forth in the SEC's 1989 Interpretive Re-
(D.N.J. 1992). The courts dismissed these cases after determining that the defendants
had, in fact, met the applicable standard for disclosure in such actions and that, contrary
to plaintiffs' allegations, there were no omissions of information that should have been
disclosed. See, e.g., Ferber, 802 F. Supp. at 711 (stating that plaintiff's allegation of a
material omission for failure to comply with Item 303 failed as "a matter of law").
170. 802 F. Supp. 698 (D. Conn. 1992).
171. See id. at 711.
172. See supra text accompanying note 80.
173. Ferber, 802 F. Supp. at 711.
174. See id!
175. 793 F. Supp. 543 (D.N.J. 1992).
176. See id at 558.
177. See id.
178. See id.
179. Id.
180. See also Greenstone v. Cambex Corp., 975 F.2d 22 (Ist Cir. 1992). In Cambex,
the First Circuit acknowledged the test set forth in Item 303. However, it was uncertain
as to whether that was the appropriate standard to apply. See id. at 28 ("We need not
investigate the merits of this claim. . . . nor need we decide whether the appropriate
standard is... 'reasonabl[e] likel[ihood' or some other standard]... [for the Complaint]
fails adequately to specify facts that would meet any (standard].").
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lease on MD&A, their analyses are of limited precedential value because
neither court provided a detailed discussion of their application of that
test.
b. Weakening Resistance to the Imposition of Rule 10b-5 Liability for
MD&A Deficiencies
The strength of the Ninth Circuit's pre-Caterpillar opposition to al-
lowing Rule lOb-5 claims for Item 303 violations has yet to be directly
tested in the post-Caterpillar disclosure environment. Based on recent
actions,18 1 it is unclear whether courts in that circuit are as staunchly
opposed as they formerly were. There is some indication, in fact, that
their initial hard-line approach has somewhat softened.
In In re Lyondell Petrochemical Co. Securities Litigation,I82 the Ninth
Circuit was presented with the question of whether Item 303 imposes a
duty to disclose internal projections. Plaintiffs alleged under Rule lOb-5
that Lyondeli's prospectus failed to disclose internal projections that Ly-
ondell had provided to its bank in connection with its public offering. In
recognition of Item 303's distinction between presently known data that
will have an impact upon future operating results and other forward-
looking data,183 the court concluded that projections are not a required
disclosure under Item 303.184 Because the Lyondell court dealt with pro-
jections rather than known trends and uncertainties, this case does not
necessarily signal that the Ninth Circuit would refuse to impose Rule
lOb-5 liability for Item 303 violations if presented with the correct fac-
tual scenario.18 5
181. See In re Lyondell Petrochemical Co. Sec. Litig., [Current Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCII) 97,335, at 95,704-05 (9th Cir. Jan. 29, 1993) (holding that financial
forecasts are voluntary disclosures under 17 C.F.R. § 229.10(b) and are therefore not
required to be disclosed under Item 303); In re Jenny Craig Sec. Litig., [Current Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 97,337, at 95,723 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 19, 1992) (holding
that allegations of nondisclosures in the MD&A support Rule lOb-5 claims); In re
Cypress Semiconductor Sec. Litig., [1992 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1
97,060, at 94,698 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 23, 1992) (dismissing claim asserting a private right of
action under Item 303 of Regulation S-K).
182. [Current Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 97,335 (9th Cir. Jan. 29, 1993).
183. See id. at 95,705 n.6 ("Instruction 7 of [Item 303(a)] provides in pertinent part:
'Registrants are encouraged, but not required, to supply forward-looking information.
This is to be distinguished from presently known data which will impact upon future
operating results, such as known future increases in costs. .. .' ").
184. See id. at 95,705. The court's refusal to require the disclosure of projections is
entirely consistent with Item 303 of Regulation S-K. Compare 17 C.F.R. § 229.303 (re-
quiring the disclosure of known trends and uncertainties) with 17 C.F.R. § 229.10(b)
(encouraging the disclosure of projections).
185. Unlike the Ninth Circuit's approach in Convergent Technologies where the court
refused to require the disclosure of projections even though such projections indicated
management's knowledge of pricing and cost problems and other uncertainties in the
profitability of its product line, the Ninth Circuit's approach in Lyondell differed. Com-
pare In re Convergent Technologies Sec. Litig., 948 F.2d 507, 510 (9th Cir. 1991) with
Lyondell, [Current Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 97,335, at 95,704. In Lyondell,
there was no indication that the projections reflected management's knowledge of future
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In fact, in at least one instance, there has been an indication that
courts in the Ninth Circuit may be stepping back from their original po-
sition opposing Rule lOb-5 liability for MD&A deficiencies. In In re
Jenny Craig Securities Litigation, 1 6 the court declined to dismiss plain-
tiff's allegations of noncompliance with Item 303, noting that such
claims "lend additional support to plaintiffs' [Rule lOb-5] claims."', 7
This case may represent a shift in attitude within the Ninth Circuit.
III. THE DUTY TO DISCLOSE FORWARD-LOOKING INFORMATION IN
THE MD&A
Item 303 of Regulation S-K expressly creates an affirmative duty to
disclose forward-looking information regarding the impact of events,
trends, and uncertainties on a corporation's future liquidity, capital re-
sources, and results of operations.'18 Such a regulation ensures that in-
vestors are provided with information about the future prospects of a
corporation-an important factor in the investment decision."8 9 More-
over, it increases the quality of information reaching investors by estab-
lishing certain standards of reliability. Item 303 is a valuable pro-
investor disclosure provision because essentially, there is no better way
for investors to view a corporation than through the "eyes of
management."
Although Item 303 is a move in the right direction toward full and fair
disclosure, its effectiveness depends upon corporate compliance with its
requirements. To date, however, compliance has been problematic.'"'
Prior to its enforcement action in March 1992 against Caterpillar, the
SEC seemed more interested in studying and publicly debating disclosure
compliance than enforcing it.' 9' The courts, too, have been of little
problems. In fact, the court indicated that "[t]he outcome of the present case would be
entirely different had plaintiff alleged Lyondell's internal predictions were based on ex-
isting... factors known only to the [Lyondell]." Id. It would appear, therefore, that the
Lyondell court made a correct determination that the forward-looking information at
issue was not required to be disclosed by Item 303 but was merely a voluntary disclosure
under 17 C.F.R. § 229.10(b). Given that factual scenario, the outcome in Lyondell is not
inconsistent with the outcomes in Ferber v. Travelers Corp., 802 F. Supp. 698 (D. Conn.
1992) and In re Donald J. Trump Casino Sec. Litig., 793 F. Supp. 543 (D.NJ. 1992)
which dealt with forward-looking information that was required by Item 303.
186. [Current Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 97,337 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 19,
1992).
187. Id. at 95,723.
188. See 1989 Interpretive Release, supra note 17, 73,193, at 62,841-42.
189. See, Poole, Improving the Reliability, supra note 16, at 550. The investment deci-
sion-making process is future-oriented. With access to forward-looking information
about a corporation, investors can better analyze a security's expected risk and return and
therefore make sounder investment decisions.
190. See, eg., 1989 Interpretive Release, supra note 17, 72,436, at 62,145 (noting that
206 of 218 corporations in phase I of its review and 139 of 141 corporations in phase II
were requested to amend or supplement their MD&A or upgrade future compliance with
Item 303).
191. See id.
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assistance in enforcing compliance with Item 303's disclosure obligation.
They have been, in some instances, completely unwilling to enforce Item
303 through the securities fraud provisions,192 and in others uncertain
about where to draw the line in determining whether there is a duty to
disclose under Item 303.193 The combined result is that, although the
disclosures required under Item 303 are extremely valuable to investors,
Item 303 has not been enforced in a way that assures this information
reaches investors.
A. Imposition of Rule 10b-5 Liability for Nondisclosures in
the MD&A
The problem of non-compliance with Item 303 may be partially reme-
died by the grant of unprecedented cease and desist powers to the SEC in
the Securities Enforcement Remedies and Penny Stock Reform Act of
1990.1' It is apparent from the March 1992 Caterpillar order that the
SEC is willing to use its new power to force compliance with Item 303's
requirements. In fact, some commentators expect that in the future, "the
[SEC] will be less likely to settle similar alleged misconduct with a cease-
and-desist order and will, instead, seek to ratchet upward the penalties to
be imposed."' 95
In addition to the SEC's willingness to use its enforcement powers,
corporate management is likely to face other strong incentives to comply
with Item 303's disclosure requirements. In particular, it appears that
192. See supra notes 157-67 and accompanying text.
193. See supra notes 151-55, 169-80, and accompanying text.
194. The Securities Enforcement Remedies Act gives the SEC broad authority to enter
cease and desist orders restraining any violation of the securities laws by any person (or
corporation). See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-3 (Supp. 111990). This new authority was used by the
SEC in its enforcement action against Caterpillar for MD&A violations. See Caterpillar,
supra note 11, at 63,050.
The SEC's new cease and desist powers represent a significant increase over those pow-
ers previously held by the SEC under the authority of § 15(c)(4) of the 1934 Act. This
section gave the SEC limited authority to enter orders compelling compliance with §§ 12,
13, 14, and 15 of the 1934 Act. The existence of this authority, however, was largely
ineffective for the SEC was not given the corresponding power to enter penalties for non-
compliance with its order. See Harold S. Bloomenthal & Samuel Wolff, Emerging
Trends In Securities Law (1991 ed.).
Under the new provisions, the SEC may enter an order against any person (or corpora-
tion) violating the securities laws and direct such person (or corporation) to "cease and
desist from committing or causing such violation and any future violation." 15 U.S.C.
§ 78u-3(a) (Supp. 11 1990). In addition, the SEC may order the corporation to take spe-
cific steps to effect compliance within a period of time specified by the SEC and if the
cease and desist order is violated, the SEC may initiate a proceeding to impose a civil
penalty. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(3)(A) (Supp. 11 1990). In addition, in any cease and
desist proceeding, the SEC may order disgorgement of any profit obtained as a result of
the violation. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-3(e) (Supp. 111990). Thus, the SEC now has a power-
ful weapon to enforce the securities laws.
195. Pitt et al., supra note 12, at 487 (indicating that, to date, the SEC's activity in the
area of MD&A disclosures demonstrates similarities to an enforcement pattern com-
monly used by the SEC).
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with the SEC's recent focus on MD&A disclosure requirements in Cater-
pillar, courts may begin to put aside their reluctance toward imposing a
duty to disclose forward-looking information in the MD&A. Corporate
management may therefore find its once overlooked disclosures (or
nondislosures) now subject to scrutiny from two sides of the legal sys-
tem-the administrative side in SEC enforcement actions and the judicial
side in Rule lOb-5 nondisclosure actions.
1. Duty of Disclosure Under Rule lOb-5
Under Rule lOb-5, the general rule is that there is no affirmative duty
to disclose all material information.'96 This means that Rule 1Ob-5 liabil-
ity cannot be based on a failure to disclose material information unless an
affirmative duty to disclose exists. Courts, however, have created numer-
ous exceptions to the general rule. Among the specific circumstances
that trigger an affirmative duty to disclose are when a corporate insider
trades on confidential information, when a corporation has made incom-
plete or misleading prior disclosures, and when a statute or regulation
requires disclosure.' 9 7 Since Item 303 of Regulation S-K creates a
mandatory disclosure requirement, under the third exception listed
above, it also creates an affirmative duty to disclose the type of forward-
looking information specified in the regulation. Therefore, a violation of
Item 303, arguably, is sufficient for imposition of Rule lOb-5 liability.
Courts may decide to seize the opportunities offered by this exception
and enforce the affirmative duties of Item 303 under Rule lOb-5.' 98
196. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 239 n.17 (1988); Chiarella v. United
States, 445 U.S. 222, 230 (1980); Milton v. Van Dora Co., 961 F.2d 965, 968 n.4 (Ist Cir.
1992); Schlike v. Seafirst Corp., 866 F.2d 935, 944 (7th Cir. 1989); Taylor v. First Union
Corp., 857 F.2d 240, 243 (4th Cir. 1988), cerL denied, 489 U.S. 1080 (1989); Jett v.
Sunderman, 840 F.2d 1487, 1493 (9th Cir. 1988); Roeder v. Alpha Indus., Inc., 814 F.2d
22, 26 (1st Cir. 1987); Starkman v. Marathon Oil Co., 772 F.2d 231, 238 (6th Cir. 1985);
Flynn v. Bass Bros. Enters., 744 F.2d 978, 984 (3d Cir. 1984); Staffin v. Greenberg, 672
F.2d 1196, 1202 (3d Cir. 1982); Alfus v. Pyramid Technology Corp., 764 F. Supp. 598,
601 (N.D. Cal. 1991); Johnston v. Wilbourn, 760 F. Supp. 578, 582 (S.D. Miss. 1991);
Dillon v. Militano, 731 F. Supp. 634, 638 n.6 (S.D.N.Y. 1990); Holstein v. Armstrong,
[1990-1991 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 95,801, at 98,855 (N.D. Ill.
1990); Tew v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., [1989-1990 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCII) $ 94,903, at 94,999-001 (S.D. Fla. 1990); Antinoph v. Laverell Reynolds
Sec., Inc., 703 F. Supp. 1185, 1189 (E.D. Pa. 1989); Jaroslawicz v. Engelhard Corp., 704
F. Supp. 1296, 1299 (D.N.J. 1989); Lessner v. Casey, 681 F. Supp. 415, 416 (E.D. Mich.
1988).
197. See Glazer v. Formica Corp., 964 F.2d 149, 156-57 (2d Cir. 1992); Royal Business
Group v. Realist, Inc., 933 F.2d 1056, 1065 (1st Cir. 1991); Backman v. Polaroid Corp.,
910 F.2d 10, 12-13 (1st Cir. 1990); Roeder v. Alpha Indus. Inc., 814 F.2d 22, 25 (1st Cir.
1987); In re General Motors Class E Stock Buyout Sec. Litig., 694 F. Supp. 1119, 1128
(D. Del. 1988); Block et al., Affirmative Duties, supra note 14, at 1245-55 (discussing
these and additional affirmative disclosure duties); Victor Brudney, A Note on Materiality
and Soft Information Under the Federal Securities Laws, 75 Va. L. Rev. 723, 726-27, 736-
48 (1989); Carl W. Schneider, Soft Information: Counseling on Disclosure, 18th Annual
Instit. on Sec. Reg. 351, 358-80 (1986).
198. Despite the affirmative disclosure duty created by Item 303, there appear to have
been few attempts to base Rule lOb-5 claims on Item 303 violations. Of the few attempts,
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2. Standard to Be Applied in Rule lOb-5 Cases
The question of whether Rule lOb-5 liability may be imposed for fail-
ure to comply with the affirmative duty established by Item 303 has been
relatively untested in the courts.199 The few courts that have attempted
to sort through the requirements of Item 303 have taken expected but
disappointingly inconsistent approaches to the imposition of Rule lOb-5
liability for MD&A deficiencies. At one end of the spectrum are courts
which interpret Item 303 as not requiring the disclosure of any forward-
looking information.2 "° At the other end of the spectrum are courts that
recognize an affirmative duty to disclose, but that appear easily satisfied
that the Item 303 test has been met. 20' From this variety of approaches,
none have succeeded. The reasons for this are many. First, although the language of
Item 303 sets up a mandatory disclosure requirement, it is possible that Item 303 was
misperceived by the courts as only an experimental part of the SEC's disclosure system.
For example, when the Advisory Committee conducted its review of the SEC's disclosure
policies in 1978, it had recommended that the SEC establish experimental programs to
improve, among other things, the management discussion and analysis section, which it
deemed to be potentially one of the most valuable sections of a disclosure report. See
Advisory Committee Report, supra note 5, at 88,667-68; see also Walker v. Action Indus.
Inc., 802 F.2d 703, 709 (4th Cir. 1986) ("We perceive the current SEC regulatory envi-
ronment to be [in] an experimental stage regarding [forward-looking] disclosures."), cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 1065 (1987). A second possible explanation of why there have been so
few Rule lob-5 actions based on Item 303 violations, is that, at least until the 1989 Inter-
pretive Release, there was little guidance for plaintiffs attorneys to fashion a Rule lob-5
claim out of such violations. That plaintiff lawyers were uncertain of how to bring such a
claim is evident from the early Ninth Circuit cases. See supra note 156. In those cases,
they failed to allege a violation of SEC disclosure rules. Whatever the public opinion was
on MD&A, whether MD&A was viewed as a serious provision or as a mere experiment,
it is clear that today the SEC regards it as an extremely important section that requires
greater attention.
199. The issue of whether Item 303 imposes an affirmative disclosure duty, however,
has received considerable attention from commentators. See, e.g., Fiflis, supra note 68;
Pitt et al., supra note 12; Dennis J. Block & Jonathan M. Hoff, MD&A Disclosures in a
Weak Economy, N.Y. L.J., Feb. 28, 1991, at 5; Dennis J. Block & Jonathan M. Hoff, The
SEC's 'Caterpillar' Order: Trends In MD&A Disclosure, N.Y. L.J., July 2, 1992, at 5.
200. See supra notes 156-67 and accompanying text.
201. See Ferber v. Travelers Corp., 802 F. Supp. 686 (D. Conn. 1992); In re Bell At-
lantic Corp. Sec. Litig., 1991 WL 234236, at *8-*9 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 31, 1991). Although
the court in Bell Atlantic, recognized the test set forth by Item 303 and even cited exam-
ples from the 1989 Interpretive Release, its discussion indicates that it may have applied
that test incorrectly. The Bell Atlantic court indicated that the "reasonable likelihood"
test of Item 303 would have been satisfied by a numerical chart contained in the Form 10-
Q which listed growth in revenues for the preceding quarter. Id. Although the historical
data contained in the chart numerically demonstrated a negative trend in earnings, the
SEC, in its 1987 Concept Release specifically stated that facts disclosed elsewhere in an
SEC filing must also be analyzed in the MD&A section if they are reasonably likely to
have an impact on future earnings. See 1987 Concept Release, supra note 73, at 88,623.
Since the SEC's concept release implies the need for more than a chart to satisfy the Item
303 test, it appears that the Bell Atlantic court's statement, implying that it would have
found that the alleged omissions had been disclosed, contradicts SEC requirements.
The Ferber court's analysis appears to be more in line with the Item 303 test. There,
the court reviewed Traveler's SEC filings to determine whether Travelers had discussed
trends in the local real estate market, as well as trends in Travelers' portfolios. However,
though the court treated Item 303 as the source of an affirmative disclosure duty, it
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it is evident that courts are not yet comfortable with using Item 303 to
impose an affirmative duty to disclose forward-looking information.2°2
Item 303, however, does impose an affirmative duty to disclose. Plain-
tiff attorneys therefore can be expected to continue basing Rule lOb-5
claims on Item 303 violations. In light of this affirmative duty and the
expectation of increased litigation, it is unacceptable for the courts to
continue approaching the issues raised in these suits in the inconsistent
ways that they have to date. If, in Rule lOb-5 actions, courts are unwill-
ing or unable to apply the Item 303 materiality test as written, the ques-
tion is whether the same result can be obtained if courts apply their own
tests to nondisclosures in the MD&A.20 3 To ascertain whether this is
possible, it is necessary to compare the forward-looking disclosures
which the SEC has required under Item 303 against the forward-looking
disclosures that courts have required under their own tests. °4
hedged its finding by analyzing whether the filings as a whole were sufficiently cautionary
about the future. An analysis of the overall cautionary nature of SEC filings is proper
only in determining a corporation's liability for representations, not omissions. See infra
notes 256-73 and accompanying text (discussing safe harbor protection for forward-look-
ing statements, not omissions). To treat omissions otherwise would bypass the function
of the MD&A, which is to allow investors to view the corporation through the eyes of
management. For example, a court focused solely on the overall cautionary language of
an SEC filing might be satisfied by a statement that "the economy is uncertain and future
earnings may be lower, due to increases in nonperforming loans," whereas the affirmative
duty imposed by Item 303 may require a statement closer to "nonperforming loans in-
creased X% over the last two years; there is no foreseeable improvement; if the trend
continues, there is a potential loss of SYI-$Y2; the corporation is currently attempting to
combat this problem with Plans Z1, Z2 and Z3." It is unclear whether the Ferber court
would have been satisfied by cautionary language alone. The Trump Casino court, how-
ever, was clearly satisfied. This result is undesirable. Like the SEC's safe harbor provi-
sions, the "bespeaks caution" doctrine, see infra notes 271-73, is intended to encourage
forward-looking disclosures by protecting such disclosures once made. This intention is
obviously defeated if the doctrine is applied to protect omissions.
202. The reluctance of the courts to find an affirmative duty to disclose may possibly
stem from their unwillingness to use the materiality test for Item 303 disclosures, as set
forth in the 1987 Concept Release and the 1989 Interpretive Release. Courts may be
uncomfortable with the fine distinction drawn by the test:
Required disclosure is based on currently known trends events, and uncertain-
ties that are reasonably expected to have material effects....
In contrast, optional forward-looking disclosure involves anticipating a future
trend or event or anticipating a less predictable impact of a known event, trend or
uncertainty.
1989 Interpretive Release, supra note 17, 73,193, at 62,842. Without guidance, it can be
difficult to determine whether information falls into the required disclosure category or
the optional disclosure category. See eg., James J. Maiwurm, Annual Disclosure in a
Declining Economy-Some Year-End Reminders, 5 Insights (P-H), at 3 (Jan. 1991)
(describing the distinction as "a wide and murky grey area").
203. See supra notes 124-47 and accompanying text (describing approaches to the dis-
closure of forward-looking information outside of the Item 303 context).
204. In making this comparison, one should keep in mind that courts have addressed
the duty to disclose forward-looking information entirely outside of the Item 303 context.
As such, they have not analyzed the cases from the standpoint of whether a statute or
regulation imposes an affirmative disclosure duty, but rather, whether an affirmative dis-
closure duty arose in order to make the corporation's prior disclosures not misleading.
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a. Material Information That the SEC Would Require to Be Disclosed
Under Item 303
Since the adoption of Item 303 of Regulation S-K, there have been
several SEC enforcement actions alleging MD&A deficiencies. In addi-
tion, the SEC has issued interpretive guidance on the disclosure require-
ments of Item 303. From these items it is possible to extrapolate broader
categories of forward-looking information which the SEC would find to
be material under the Item 303 test.2"5 The SEC has and most likely will
continue to find an affirmative duty to disclose the following types of
forward-looking information under Item 303.206
i. Changes in a Significant Component of the Corporation's Business
The SEC enforcement actions and interpretive releases indicate that
whenever known trends, events, and uncertainties are likely to affect a
significant component of the corporation's business-for example, a sub-
sidiary which is a major contributor to the corporation's bottom line or a
customer which purchases a large percentage of the corporation's out-
put-the corporation should make a disclosure in the MD&A. More-
over, it is evident that simply breaking the financial statements into
segments is insufficient. A full discussion of the events affecting the com-
ponent and their expected impact on the corporation is necessary. For
instance, in Caterpillar,2"7 the SEC noted that CBSA had accounted for a
Court have used this approach largely because, other than the duty imposed by the
MD&A regulations, there is no statutorily-imposed duty to disclose forward-looking in-
formation. See supra notes 124-47 and accompanying text.
205. In addition to its enforcement actions and detailed examples from actual MD&As
that were filed, the SEC has occasionally generated its own hypothetical examples of
information that may be required to be disclosed in the MD&A. One such example,
included in the 1987 Concept Release, contains the following information:
1. Material changes in product mix or in the relative profitability of lines of
business;
2. Material changes in advertising, research, development, product introduc-
tion or other discretionary costs;
3. The acquisition or disposition of a material asset other than in the ordinary
course of business;
4. Material and unusual charges or gains, including credits or charges associ-
ated with discontinuation of operations;
5. Material changes in assumptions underlying deferred costs and the plan for
amortization of such costs;
6. Material changes in assumed investment return and in actuarial assump-
tions used to calculate contributions to pension funds; and
7. The closing of a material facility or material interruption of business or
completion of a material contract.
1987 Concept Release, supra note 73, at 88,624.
206. For additional categories extrapolated solely from the Caterpillar release, see Pitt
et al., supra note 12, at 488-90.
207. The Caterpillar opinion has been described as a "meaningful document, offering
significant guidance.., as to the interpretation of [the SEC's] disclosure requirements."
Id. at 487. The SEC's opinion emphasizes certain factors that it apparently believes
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significant portion (23%) of Caterpillar's net profits in 1989.2° The SEC
concluded that any "reasonably likely" negative changes in CBSA's op-
erations therefore should have been disclosed in Caterpillar's MD&A be-
cause Caterpillar's own bottom line would be significantly affected." 9
Moreover, the SEC noted that the mere display of CBSA's results on a
segregated basis would not have obviated the need to discuss CBSA's
operations in Caterpillar's MD&A.210
In In re American Express Co.,21 the SEC found MD&A deficiencies
in Amex's 1981 and 1982 SEC filings. The corporation's MD&A failed
to discuss its insurance subsidiary's reinsurance transactions which ac-
counted for forty percent of Amex's 1981 and 1982 revenues. 2  The
reinsurance transactions at issue had been implemented to shift the sub-
sidiary's income to periods when the rest of the insurance industry
showed decreased earnings.2 13 Although Amex's MD&A discussed the
increased earnings of its insurance subsidiary, it did not attribute the gain
to the reinsurance transactions at issue or indicate that the gain was re-
sponsible for forty percent of Amex's revenue.214 Nor did its MD&A
discuss that such gains were not reasonably likely to be repeated.
Similarly, in Securities Exchange Commission v. Ronson Corp.,21 5 the
SEC indicated that Ronson's MD&A was deficient for failing to discuss
the effect on Ronson's operating results that were reasonably likely to
occur from the alteration in a major customer's manufacturing process.
The customer, which accounted for approximately fifteen percent of
Ronson's revenues, was making technological changes that Ronson ex-
pected to result in a thirty to fifty percent reduction in purchases.2" 6
Although Ronson's financial data reflected both a decline in sales and the
importance of that customer, the SEC found Ronson's MD&A deficient
because it did not disclose Ronson's knowledge of its customer's altera-
tions and the reasonably likely reduction in future purchases.217
In its 1989 Interpretive Release, the SEC gave an example of a suffi-
cient MD&A in a hypothetical situation similar to that at issue in Ron-
son. 21 In the example, the MD&A disclosed that a principal customer
accounting for approximately thirty percent of revenues intends to termi-
should have alerted management to the need for further MD&A disclosures. See Cater-
pillar, supra note 11 and accompanying text.
208. See Caterpillar, supra note 11, at 63,051.
209. See id at 63,055.
210. See id at 63,051 n.1.
211. Exchange Act Release No. 23,332, 35 SEC Docket 1163 (June 17, 1986).
212. See id at 1164.
213. See id
214. See id at 1164-65, 1169-70.
215. Litigation Release No. 10,093, [1983-1984 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L Rep.
(CCH) 99,464 (Aug. 15, 1983).
216. See id. at 96,653.
217. See Exchange Act Release No. 19,212, [1982 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L Rep.
(CCH) 83,275, at 85,479 (Nov. 4, 1982).
218. See 1989 Interpretive Release, supra note 17, 73,193, at 62,847.
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nate all purchases next quarter due to recently developed in-house capa-
bilities.219  The hypothetical MD&A also discussed the company's
expectations that this would have a material adverse effect on revenues
and income.22° In addition, the example disclosed that although efforts
were being made to develop new customers, it was expected to take six
months to generate replacement revenues.2 21
ii. Industry Trends
The SEC enforcement actions have also indicated that a corporation
must disclose in its MD&A the reasonably likely impact of any trends in
it's industry and environment. In Securities Exchange Commission v.
Bank of New England,222 the SEC found the bank's second quarter 1989
MD&A to be deficient despite various quantitative disclosures indicating
negative trends. In the bank's second quarter Form 10-Q, the bank listed
its ratio of loan loss reserves to total loans and non-performing assets. In
addition, it made quantitative disclosures of non-performing asset levels,
as well as general comments on the "softness" in the New England real
estate market and economy. The bank's MD&A was found deficient,
however, because it failed to discuss the bank's knowledge that the mar-
ket was reasonably likely to continue its downward trend, thereby in-
creasing non-performing asset levels and having substantial negative
effects on future net income.
iii. Extraordinary Results
The SEC has indicated that a corporation must discuss in its MD&A
any extraordinary or one-time financial results. Included in this discus-
sion should be the reasons for the extraordinary results, as well as the
reasons why such results are not likely to recur. Although not expressly
focusing on this factor, the SEC's opinion in Caterpillar noted that Cater-
pillar's Brazilian subsidiary CBSA had an "exceptionally profitable year"
in 1989.223 As CBSA's 1989 profit was disproportionate as an historical
matter and because management knew that such profits were not reason-
ably likely to continue, this factor should have been discussed in Cater-
pfllar's MD&A.
In In re Charter Co.,224 the SEC found MD&A deficiencies for Char-
ter's failure to discuss the one time favorable earnings effect of its treat-
ment of annuity rollovers. Charter made a marketing decision to match
interest rates offered by its competitor on annuity contracts. As a result,
219. See id.
220. See id.
221. See id.
222. Litigation Release No. 12,743, [1987-1991 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) $ 73,755 (D.D.C. 1990).
223. See Caterpillar, supra note 11, at 63,051.
224. Exchange Act Release No. 21,647, [1982-1987 Accounting Release Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 73,448 (Jan. 10, 1985).
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many of its existing annuity holders surrendered their contracts and
purchased new contracts offering higher rates. Charter treated these rol-
lovers as a restructuring of existing contracts at higher rates, rather than
as a termination of one contract and issuance of a new contract. The
result was favorable to Charter's earnings in the year the contracts were
rolled over but Charter expected significantly reduced future profit.'
The SEC held that Charter's footnote discussing the transaction was not
sufficient.226 Charter should have described in the MD&A the full conse-
quences of the transaction, making clear the likelihood that future profit-
ability was expected to be substantially reduced. 27
In another example contained in its 1989 Interpretive Release, the
SEC favorably cited the MD&A of a corporation which experienced a
forty-seven percent increase in operating income from the previous
year.22 In its MD&A, the corporation discussed the fact that nearly all
of the increase was attributable to the completion of a major contract at a
cost below that anticipated.229 The corporation noted that it expected
future operating income to be significantly less because, as a result of a
slowdown in the industry, only a portion of the profit generated by the
completed contract was expected to be replaced by new contracts." °
iv. Pending Events
The SEC's enforcement and interpretive releases indicate that pending
events-for example, renegotiations of credit agreements-must be dis-
closed, as well as the likely outcome and the effect on the corporation. In
In re Van Landingham and Patzke,231 the corporation filed its 1983
Form 10-K three weeks prior to filing for bankruptcy. Its MD&A con-
tained no mention of any liquidity problems even though in the period
prior to the filing the corporation had experienced loss of trade credit and
its banks had requested restrictive covenants as conditions to renewing
existing credit lines. The corporation's MD&A contained a brief discus-
sion of one of the requested covenants, but no discussion of the others
and no disclosure of the disagreement between the corporation and its
banks.232 In addition, though the corporation had generated several pro-
posals for resolving its cash problems, none were disclosed in the
MD&A. The SEC held that the corporation's MD&A was deficient. It
should have disclosed the implications of the corporation's discussions
with its banks and the effects that its proposals could have had on its
225. See id. at 63,172.
226. See iL at 63,176.
227. See icL
228. See 1989 Interpretive Release, supra note 17, 73,193, at 62,843.
229. See id.
230. See id
231. Exchange Act Release No. 23,249, [1982-1987 Accounting Release Transfer
Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) 73,502 (June 20, 1986).
232. See id. at 63,349-9.
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liquidity.2"'
In its 1989 Interpretive Release, the SEC provided an example of an
acceptable MD&A in a situation similar to that in Van Landingham.234
The MD&A discussed the corporation's violation of certain debt agree-
ments. Moreover, although the corporation's lenders were allowing it to
remain in violation, the MD&A discussed the possible effects if a default
were declared. 2" The MD&A indicated that a capital infusion of $4 mil-
lion would be necessary to cure the default and that the company was
currently considering various alternatives, including a sale of assets or
common stock.236
v. Changes in Management's Perspectives
The SEC enforcement releases imply that any new information that is
presented in detail to the Board of Directors may need further discussion
in the MD&A. In the Caterpillar release, the SEC noted that, although
Caterpillar's management had typically managed and analyzed the cor-
poration on a consolidated basis, in 1989 it began to present to the Direc-
tors CBSA's results separately.23 7 Under Item 303, the SEC would
require disclosure of any forward-looking information viewed by man-
agement as so significant and reasonably likely to occur that it must be
explained in detail to the directors.
In each of the five foregoing situations, the corporate defendant knew
of trends, events, or uncertainties which were likely to have an impact
upon the corporation's future financial results. The SEC has indicated
that in those situations, the Item 303 test is met and an affirmative duty
238therefore arises.
b. Comparison of SEC's Results with Results Obtained by the Courts
Due either to the courts' unwillingness or inability to apply the Item
303 materiality test, the remaining question is whether the approaches
currently employed by the courts in Rule 1Ob-5 actions yield the same
results as the approach laid out in Item 303 and taken by the SEC in its
enforcement actions. The four basic approaches employed by the courts,
however, appear insufficient in that regard.
The traditional approach2 39 clearly does not yield the same result as
Item 303's materiality test. This approach holds that all predictive infor-
mation is immaterial as a matter of law. Therefore, courts utilizing this
233. See id. at 63,349-10.
234. See 1989 Interpretive Release, supra note 17, 1 73,193, at 62,845.
235. See id.
236. See id.
237. See Caterpillar, supra note 11, at 63,051.
238. Corporate management must include a discussion of these items if the corporation
is to avoid an SEC enforcement action.
239. See supra text accompanying notes 126-29.
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approach would never find a duty to disclose the forward-looking infor-
mation required by Item 303.
The reasonable certainty approach21 presents a similar problem.
Under that approach, courts will not impose a duty to disclose unless the
forward-looking information is reasonably certain. Much of the informa-
tion required to be disclosed under the Item 303 materiality test is "rea-
sonably certain" in the sense that management knows a current event is
likely to have an impact on the future. The second prong of Item 303's
test, however, also requires the disclosure of known events whose poten-
tial impact management cannot determine with certainty.2 ' At least
with regard to this latter category of information, the reasonable cer-
tainty test would render a different result than the Item 303 test.
The substantial certainty test242 suffers from the same problem as the
reasonable certainty test. By not requiring disclosure of forward-looking
information unless it is "virtually as certain as hard facts," '243 this test
would not require disclosure of forward-looking information falling
under the second prong of Item 303's test-known events whose impact
cannot be determined with certainty. 2 " In this regard, the substantial
certainty test would yield results inconsistent with those obtained by the
Item 303 test.
The balancing test employed by the Third Circuit245 comes closest to
yielding results consistent with Item 303's materiality test. Even this
test, however, falls short of requiring the same disclosures as the Item
303 test. Factors bearing on the relevance of information, such as its
availability from other sources, might permit courts to find sufficient, dis-
closure that the Item 303 test would find inadequate. For example, Item
303 would require discussion of information in the MD&A even if infor-
mation bearing on the issue was quantitatively included in the same fil-
ing."4 The balancing test, however, might find irrelevant a discussion of
information that is already included in quantitative form.247 Under that
situation, the balancing test would lead to a different result than Item
303's materiality test.
c. Closing the Gap
The approaches currently used by the courts clearly are insufficient in
240. See supra notes 130-37 and accompanying text.
241. See supra text accompanying note 80.
242. See supra text accompanying notes 138-42.
243. Starkman v. Marathon Oil Co., 722 F.2d 231, 241 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. denied,
475 U.S. 1015 (1986).
244. See supra text accompanying note 80.
245. See supra text accompanying notes 143-47.
246. See 1989 Interpretive Release, supra note 17, 73,193, at 62,843.
247. See In re Bell Atlantic Corp. See. Litig., 1991 WL 234236, at *8-*9 (F.D. Pa. Oct.
30, 1991) (indicating court would have found Item 303 satisfied by quantitative chart in
filing, even though there was no discussion of the impact reasonably likely to result from
the trend indicated in the chart).
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that they would yield results inconsistent with those that the SEC in-
tended.24 Under any of the approaches currently taken by the courts,
forward-looking information would be disclosed less frequently than if
the Item 303 materiality test were properly implemented. This disparity
is undesirable.
Courts must modernize their approach to the disclosure of forward-
looking information. For more than a decade, they have lagged behind
the SEC in this area.249 Now that the SEC is progressing further, by
mandating the disclosure of known trends, events, demands, and uncer-
tainties that are reasonably likely to have a material future impact, the
distance between the SEC and the courts will widen unless there is a
response from the courts.
The most logical response, and the response that would move the
courts closest toward the SEC's position, would be for courts to adopt
the materiality test set forth in the SEC's 1989 Interpretive Release.250
Although to date, the courts have indicated discomfort with doing so,
there is an immense amount of information available to guide courts
through the process of applying that test. The courts' unease appears to
derive primarily from the test's fine distinction between known trends,
events, demands, and uncertainties and the anticipation of those
events.25 1 To date, however, courts have not looked to SEC enforcement
actions or the examples contained in the SEC's interpretive release2 2 in
attempting to sort through the difference. These materials should be
used by the courts. They provide invaluable background on the issue and
help clarify the meaning of a test whose language is unclear to the
courts.25 3 Not only do these materials help to clarify the test, but in
248. Nor is the problem resolved by courts that have refused to adopt any of the four
general approaches. See Garcia v. Cordova, 930 F.2d 826 (10th Cir. 1991); Isquith v.
Middle S. Utils., 847 F.2d 186 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 926 (1988). These courts
utilize a case-by-case approach. They take into consideration the policy interests of re-
quiring disclosure, the nature of the particular predictive information, and the specific
facts indicating importance, reliability, and investor impact. See, e.g., id. at 206. Again,
the results of this test can be expected to differ from the results of the Item 303 test with
respect to information whose impact management cannot predict with certainty.
249. See supra notes 122-47 and accompanying text.
250. See supra text accompanying note 80.
251. The SEC, in its 1989 Interpretive Release, attempted to clarify the distinction
between the different types of forward-looking information. See supra note 89. Courts
and management alike appear to have difficulty distinguishing between the two. How-
ever, with respect to the remaining portion of Item 303's materiality test, see supra text
accompanying note 80, there appears to be less confusion or at least, to date, no action
has focused on the "reasonably likely [to have a material effect]" aspect of the test.
252. See supra text accompanying notes 205-38.
253. In addition, it is useful to review the accounting standards governing this area of
disclosure. One commentator has suggested that the distinction between known trends,
events and uncertainties and anticipations of the future has its antecedents in the audi-
tor's distinction between "projections," which are extrapolations from historic data, and
"forecasts" which are hypothetically assumed future events. See Fiflis, supra note 68, at
*3; see also Doyle, supra note 140, at *1 ("To bring [forward-looking information] more
into mainstream disclosure, there should be greater recognition of the interplay between
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some instances they may strongly suggest a resolution to a particular
factual situation before a court. For instance, had the court in In re Ver-
ifone Securities Litigation254 reviewed the SEC materials, it may have
decided that the forward-looking information at issue in that case-de-
creased future earnings due to non-renewal of one-time orders-was re-
quired to be disclosed.25 Although a review of SEC enforcement actions
and interpretive releases cannot be expected to provide an easy answer in
all or even most cases, it will provide the courts with some necessary
guidance in applying the Item 303 materiality test. Therefore, it appears
unnecessary for courts to develop yet another test, when doing so would
only mean backtracking over ground already covered by the SEC.
B. Safe Harbor Protection for Item 303 Disclosures
One expected result of the SEC bringing further enforcement actions
and the courts imposing Rule lOb-5 liability for 303 violations is in-
creased compliance with Item 303's forward-looking disclosure require-
ments. In transforming nondisclosures into affirmative forward-looking
statements, however, corporations will be exposed to greater liability
under the federal securities laws for their representations, rather than
their omissions. Once disclosed, the forward-looking statements required
by Item 303 will be subject to the same requirements of accuracy and
completeness as any other public statement made by a corporation. As a
result, the importance of the SEC safe harbor rules, Rules 175 and 3b-
6,256 will grow.
SEC Rules 175 and 3b-6 provide safe harbors for forward-looking in-
formation disclosed in periodic reports, proxy materials, and prospec-
tUses. 25 7 These provisions state that a disclosure will not be deemed
fraudulent unless "it is shown that such statement was made... without
a reasonable basis or was disclosed other than in good faith."" 8
Although the safe harbor rules explicitly cover Item 303 disclosures and
voluntary forward-looking disclosures,25 9 it appears that courts have in-
frequently relied on these rules in determining Rule lOb-5 liability for
any type of forward-looking statements. Given the expected increase in
forward-looking disclosures, what is required is a more concerted effort
by the courts to offer a safe harbor to corporations that have complied
with the relevant disclosure rules.
Although application of the safe harbor provisions has been infre-
quent, there appears to be a developing trend toward protection of for-
legal and accounting concepts in determining when prospective.., information . . .
should be used."). Although the MD&A distinction is not identical to the auditing dis-
tinction, the underlying nature of the MD&A and accounting concepts are similar.
254. 784 F. Supp. 1471 (N.D. Cal. 1992).
255. See supra notes 164-67 and accompanying text.
256. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.175, 240.3b-6 (1992).
257. See supra text accompanying notes 50-63.
258. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.175(a), 240.3b-6 (1992).
259. See supra text accompanying note 56.
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ward-looking statements. In two recent Seventh Circuit cases, the court
applied Rule 175, granting summary judgment for the defendants in one
action2" and dismissing the other action.261 In Wielgos v. Common-
wealth Edison Co.,262 Commonwealth shareholders asserted that the cor-
poration lacked a reasonable basis for the cost projection disclosed in its
1983 prospectus that later turned out to be inaccurate. Commonwealth
included in its prospectus a projection of the cost of completing a nuclear
reactor that it was building. The projection had been prepared nine
months prior to the prospectus and was out of date, but the court found
the cost projection to have a reasonable basis because the prospectus in-
corporated Commonwealth's latest quarterly report which discussed the
expected increase in costs. 263 Moreover, the court reasoned that since
Rule 175 assumes investors are sophisticated and can understand the
limits of a projection,264 corporations need not disclose tentative internal
projections that differ from disclosed projections, unless such internal
projections are so certain that the published figures are misleading.265
The court granted summary judgment for Commonwealth because plain-
tiffs failed to meet their burden of showing that Commonwealth's projec-
tions were made without a reasonable basis or without good faith.266
The Seventh Circuit again applied Rule 175 in Roots Partnership v.
Lands' End, Inc.267 Lands' End discussed its earnings goals in its 1989
Form 10-K and in various press releases.268 Plaintiffs alleged that de-
fendant's goal of ten percent pre-tax profits lacked a reasonable basis be-
cause it differed from internal projections which indicated an expected
pre-tax profits of 9.38%. The court found that this differential did not
suggest Lands End's predictions "fell outside the realm of reasonable
probability [or] lacked a reasonable basis. '2 69 It dismissed the case be-
260. See Wielgos v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 892 F.2d 509 (7th Cir. 1989).
261. Roots Partnership v. Lands' End, Inc., 965 F.2d 1411 (7th Cir. 1992).
262. 892 F.2d 509 (7th Cir. 1989).
263. See id. at 512.
264. See id. at 515.
265. See id. at 516 (noting that to require the disclosure of tentative estimates would
mean "that once the annual cycle of estimation begins, a [corporation would have to]
cease selling stock until it has resolved internal disputes and is ready with a new
projection").
266. See id. at 513 (noting that the only question before the court was whether the
statements lacked a reasonable basis because plaintiffs had not attempted to establish a
lack of good faith).
267. 965 F.2d 1411 (7th Cir. 1992).
268. Given that the forward-looking information at issue appeared in a Form 10-K
rather than a registration statement or prospectus, the court would have correctly consid-
ered this case under Rule 3b-6. Rule 3b-6 provides a safe harbor for statements in docu-
ments required by the 1934 Act as opposed to Rule 175, which provides a safe harbor for
statements in documents required by the 1933 Act. Since the language of both Rules is
identical, however, the outcome would have been the same. For an indication of how
courts would apply Rule 3b-6, see In re Bally Mfg. Sec. Corp. Litig., 141 F.R.D. 262,
271-273 (N.D. Ill. 1992) (dismissing case because plaintiffs failed to allege facts sufficient
to defeat Rule 3b-6's safe harbor).
269. Roots, 965 F.2d at 1418.
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cause plaintiffs failed to sufficiently allege the lack of good faith or a rea-
sonable basis in making the prediction.270
Other circuits, though not relying on Rules 175 or 3b-6, have begun to
apply essentially what is a common law safe harbor rule for forward-
looking statements.27' This rule, also known as the "bespeaks caution"
doctrine, applies primarily to offering materials that are accompanied by
forward-looking statements. To the extent that such materials are ac-
companied by adequate cautionary language,27 2 the included forward-
looking statements are not actionable as securities fraud. To date, it ap-
pears that this doctrine has been adopted in four circuits.27 3
The courts' application of Rules 175 and 3b-6 and of the "bespeaks
caution" doctrine brings the law in the area of forward-looking disclo-
sures more in-line with the framework established by the SEC. Even
today, however, only half of the circuits apply such safe harbor protec-
tion to forward-looking disclosures. Moreover, the safe harbor provi-
sions appear to be applied primarily to forward-looking statements
contained in offering materials. This practice leaves uncovered a wide
range of other forward-looking statements, particularly those appearing
in periodic reports and proxy statements. If Item 303 is to be enforced
by the courts under Rule lOb-5 and by the SEC under their cease and
desist powers, then courts must give effect to all statutory provisions, or
their functional equivalents, that are expressly applicable to Item 303 dis-
closures. To require the disclosure of forward-looking information by
corporations who might otherwise not do so, but to not allow those cor-
porations to use the safe harbor statutory provisions that protect
mandatory forward-looking disclosures, would produce an unjust result.
270. See id
271. See Moorhead v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 949 F.2d 243, 245-
46 (8th Cir. 1991) (dismissing securities claims pertaining to forward-looking statements
in offering materials); I. Meyer Pincus & Assoc. v. Oppenheimer & Co., 936 F.2d 759,
763 (2d Cir. 1991) (same); Sinay v. Lamson & Sessions Co., 948 F.2d 1037, 1040-41 (6th
Cir. 1991) (dismissing securities claims pertaining to forward-looking statements in press
release); Romani v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, 929 F.2d 875, 879 (1st Cir. 1991) (dis-
missing securities claims pertaining to forward-looking statements made in registration
statement and prospectus).
272. Although the adequacy of the cautionary statements is to be decided on a case-by-
case basis, it is clear that in all instances mere boilerplate risk statements will be insuffi-
cient to invoke the protection of this doctrine. See eg., In re Donald J. Trump Casino
Sec. Litig., 793 F. Supp. 543, 553 (D.N.J. 1992).
273. Those circuits include the First, Second, Sixth, and Eighth. See supra note 271
for a list of the relevant cases; see also Barrios v. Paco Pharmaceutical Servs., Inc., [Cur-
rent Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 97,373, at 95,973-74 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 4,
1993) (involving forward-looking statements in private placement memoranda); In re
Worlds of Wonder Sec. Litig., [Current Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) r
97,355, at 95,811-814 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 20, 1993) (involving forward-looking statements in
prospectus); Porter v. Shearson Lehman Bros. Inc., 802 F. Supp. 41, 57 (S.D. Tex. Aug.
3, 1992) (same); Shochat v. Weisz, 797 F. Supp. 1097, 1110-12 (E.D.N.Y. June 23, 1992)
(involving forward-looking statements in private placement memoranda); In re Donald J.
Trump Casino Sec. Litig., 793 F. Supp. 543 (D.N.J. Jun. 2, 1992) (involving forward-
looking statements in prospectus).
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CONCLUSION
A major objective of the federal securities laws is to provide investors
with relevant information upon which to base investment decisions. For-
ward-looking information is among the most vital information because it
deals with the essence of the investment process-the expected return on
the investment. While the SEC's evolving efforts to achieve investor un-
derstanding is laudable, the standards for disclosure, particularly as they
relate to forward-looking information, remain uncertain.
Although the SEC's policy regarding the mandatory disclosure of for-
ward-looking information is satisfactory, the distinction that the SEC has
drawn between required and optional disclosures is so subtle that corpo-
rations and courts alike find Item 303 of Regulation S-K difficult to ap-
ply. This, in turn, has resulted in corporations neglecting to disclose
valuable information to investors.
The SEC ultimately may need to clarify what it means by "known
trends, events and uncertainties." In the interim, however, courts must
look to SEC enforcement materials and interpretive releases for guidance
in determining whether there is a duty to disclose. In addition, the
courts need to adopt a unified approach to granting a safe harbor to cor-
porations disclosing forward-looking information. The unified approach
should be based on the safe harbor requirements set forth by the SEC in
Rules 175 and 3b-6. Only after the current confusion regarding the
mandatory disclosure of forward-looking information in the MD&A is
resolved, can the problem regarding disclosure of other forward-looking
information, such as forecasts, be confronted.
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